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Inflation Forecast Targeting : Implementaing and Monitoring Inflation Targets

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  • Svensson, L-E-O

Abstract

Inflation targeting is shown to imply inflation forecast targeting : the central bank's inflation forecast becomes an intermediate target. Inflation forecast targeting simplifies both implementaing and monitoring of monetary policy.

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Paper provided by Stockholm - International Economic Studies in its series Papers with number 615.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:stocin:615
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UNIVERSITY OF STOCKHOLM, INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC STUDIES, S- 106 91 STOCKHOLM SWEDEN.

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Keywords: INFLATION ; MONETARY POLICY;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
  • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy

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  1. Leading Macroeconomist Leaves Central Bank
    by Mainly Macro in Mainly Macro on 2013-04-30 17:50:00
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