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Inflation forecast targeting: Implementing and monitoring inflation targets

  • Svensson, Lars E. O.

Inflation targeting is shown to imply inflation forecast targeting : the central bank's inflation forecast becomes an intermediate target. Inflation forecast targeting simplifies both implementaing and monitoring of monetary policy.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 41 (1997)
Issue (Month): 6 (June)
Pages: 1111-1146

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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:41:y:1997:i:6:p:1111-1146
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