Monetary Cohabitation in Europe
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- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1996. "Monetary Cohabitation in Europe," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 111-116, May.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, "undated". "Monetary Cohabitation in Europe," Working Papers 96, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 1996. "Monetary Cohabitation in Europe," NBER Working Papers 5532, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
EMU; Inflation Targets; Policy Coordination;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
- F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
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