Monetary Policy Uncertainty and Central Bank Accountability
There is a considerable academic literature on the relationship between Central Bank independence and inflation but the issue of Central Bank accountability and its effect of inflation performance has received very little attention. This paper looks at the issue of accountability in a simple theoretical model. Defining greater accountability as lower public uncertainty over the Central Bank's preferences, it shows that greater accountability will tend to be associated with improved inflation performance. This follows because, increased uncertainty will cause the public to raise their average inflation expectation, ceteris paribus. This can be thought of as a form of risk premium that the public add to their inflation expectations when they are uncertain about the Central Bank's future actions. Given this result, the paper goes on to establish that a given level of inflation can be achieved by different combinations of accountability and independence. Greater accountability means that the same inflation outcome can be achieved at lower independence. The paper then suggests that this result accounts for the negative correlation between independence and accountability found in Briault, Haldane and King.
|Date of creation:||Oct 1996|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Bank of England, Threadneedle Street, London, EC2R 8AH|
Phone: +44 (0)171 601 4030
Fax: +44 (0)171 601 5196
Web page: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Quah, Danny & Vahey, Shaun P, 1995.
"Measuring Core Inflation?,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(432), pages 1130-1144, September.
- Quah, Danny, 1995. "Measuring Core Inflation," CEPR Discussion Papers 1153, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Danny Quah & Shaun Vahey, 1995. "Measuring Core Inflation," Bank of England working papers 31, Bank of England.
- Danny Quah & Danny Quah & Shaun P. Vahey, 1995. "Measuring Core Inflation," CEP Discussion Papers dp0254, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Tom Doan, "undated". "RATS programs to replicate Quah and Vahey core inflation estimation," Statistical Software Components RTZ00139, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Francis Breedon & Ian Twinn, 1995. "Valuation of underwriting agreements for UK rights issues: evidence from the traded option market," Bank of England working papers 39, Bank of England.
- Roger Beaton & Paul Fisher, 1995. "The Construction of RPIY," Bank of England working papers 28, Bank of England.
- Nicola Anderson & Francis Breedon, 1996. "UK Asset Price Volatility Over the Last 50 Years," Bank of England working papers 51, Bank of England. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:boe:boeewp:54. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Digital Media Team)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.