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Inflation Forecast Targeting: Implementing and Monitoring Inflation Targets

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  • Svensson, Lars E.O.

    (Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University)

Abstract

Inflation targeting is shown to imply inflation forecast targeting: the central bank's inflation forecast becomes an explicit intermediate target. Inflation forecast targeting simplifies both implementation and monitoring of monetary policy. The weight on output stabilization determines how quickly the inflation forecast is adjusted towards the inflation target. Money growth or exchange rate targeting is generally inferior than inflation targeting and leads to higher inflation variability. Commitment to 'target rules' may be better than commitment to 'instrument rules'.

Suggested Citation

  • Svensson, Lars E.O., 1997. "Inflation Forecast Targeting: Implementing and Monitoring Inflation Targets," Seminar Papers 615, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:iiessp:0615
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Inflation targeting; inflation forecast targeting; intermediate target;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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