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Central-Bank Credibility: Why Do We Care? How Do We Build It?

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  • Alan S. Blinder

Abstract

Central bank credibility plays a pivotal role in much of the modern literature on monetary policy, yet it is difficult to measure or even assess objectively. A survey of central bankers was conducted to determine their attitudes on two important issues: why credibility matters, and how credibility can be built. The central bankers' answers are compared with the responses of NBER-affiliated macro and monetary economists. The two groups agree much more than they disagree. They are particularly united in their evaluations of ways to make a central bank credible -- assigning high ratings to the central bank's track record and low ratings to theoretical ideas like precommitment and incentive-compatible contracts.
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  • Alan S. Blinder, 2000. "Central-Bank Credibility: Why Do We Care? How Do We Build It?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1421-1431, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:90:y:2000:i:5:p:1421-1431
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.90.5.1421
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    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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