Die Deregulierung der Zentralbanken: Auf zu einem internationalen Markt für gute Geldpolitik!
The effectiveness of a central bank's monetary policy depends on the incentives of its head and board members to pursue an efficient policy in the citizens interest. Today, however, these incentives are weakened by three kinds of regulations. First, in almost all countries, only nationals may be elected as head or board members. Secondly, only individuals may be appointed to such offices, but not monetary policy firms or political parties. Thirdly, the compensations for central bank governors and board members are regulated by law. In general, these compensations are far below the amount potential candidates may earn in the private sector. This paper proposes to abolish these regulations. This enables monetary policy suppliers to become active in several countries and currency areas, to gain an international reputation for pursuing credible, stability-oriented monetary policies, and to cater for the interests of the citizens. Thus, an international market for good monetary policy could arise, allowing countries to import stability-oriented policy makers, thus benefiting the general public and, in particular, the weakly-organized social groups.
Volume (Year): 140 (2004)
Issue (Month): III (September)
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