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Central bank independence and the sacrifice ratio

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  • Jordan, Thomas J.

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  • Jordan, Thomas J., 1999. "Central bank independence and the sacrifice ratio," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 229-255, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:15:y:1999:i:2:p:229-255
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Laurence Ball, 1994. "What Determines the Sacrifice Ratio?," NBER Chapters,in: Monetary Policy, pages 155-193 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, pages 1169-1189.
    3. Taylor, John B, 1980. "Aggregate Dynamics and Staggered Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(1), pages 1-23, February.
    4. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, pages 101-121.
    5. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, pages 353-398.
    6. Posen, Adam, 1998. "Central Bank Independence and Disinflationary Credibility: A Missing Link?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 335-359, July.
    7. Taylor, John B., 1983. "`Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy' by Robert J. Barro and David B. Gordon," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, pages 123-125.
    8. Cukierman, Alex & Kalaitzidakis, Pantelis & Summers, Lawrence H. & Webb, Steven B., 1993. "Central bank independence, growth, investment, and real rates," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, pages 95-140.
    9. Alesina, Alberto & Gatti, Roberta, 1995. "Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Cost?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 196-200.
    10. Eijffinger, S.C.W., 1993. "Central bank independence in twelve industrial countries," Other publications TiSEM 0401b17a-e2c7-4179-ace9-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    11. Cukierman Alex, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, And Independance: Theory And Evidence," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, pages 1-10.
    12. Cukierman, Alex & Meltzer, Allan H, 1986. "A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1099-1128, September.
    13. Van Gompel, J, 1994. " Stabilization with Wage Indexation and Exchange Rate Flexibility," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(3), pages 251-281, September.
    14. Carl E. Walsh, 1994. "Is there a cost to having an independent central bank?," FRBSF Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    15. Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994. "How independent should a central bank be?," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 94-05, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    16. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-162, May.
    17. Fischer, Stanley, 1977. "Wage indexation and macroeconomics stability," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, pages 107-147.
    18. Cukierman Alex, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, And Independance: Theory And Evidence," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, pages 1-10.
    19. Thomas Jordan, 1997. "Disinflation costs, accelerating inflation gains, and central bank independence," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), pages 1-21.
    20. Andreas Fischer, 1996. "Central bank independence and sacrifice ratios," Open Economies Review, Springer, pages 5-18.
    21. Eijffinger, S. & De Hann, J., 1995. "The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence," Papers 9587, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
    22. Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994. "How independent should a central bank be?," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, pages 195-225.
    23. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Giamattei, Marcus, 2015. "Cold Turkey vs. gradualism: Evidence on disinflation strategies from a laboratory experiment," Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe V-67-15, University of Passau, Faculty of Business and Economics.
    2. Sergio Rossi, 2004. "Inflation Targeting and Sacrifice Ratios : The Case of the European Central Bank," International Journal of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, pages 69-85.
    3. Qin, Li & Sidiropoulos, Moïse & Spyromitros, Eleftherios, 2013. "Robust monetary policy under model uncertainty and inflation persistence," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, pages 721-728.
    4. Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Libich, Jan, 2006. "Central Bank Independence, Accountability and Transparency: Complements or Strategic Substitutes?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5470, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Costas Karfakis & Demetrios Moschos & Moïse Sidiropoulos, 2004. "Capital mobility and inflation persistence: theory and evidence from Greece," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 9(2), pages 125-133.
    6. Athina Zervoyianni & Athanasios Anastasiou & Andreas Anastasiou, 2014. "Does central bank independence really matter? Re-assessing the role of the independence of monetary policy-makers in macroeconomic outcomes," International Journal of Economics and Business Research, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, pages 427-473.
    7. Giuseppe Diana & Mose Sidiropoulos, 2004. "Central Bank Independence, Speed of Disinflation and the Sacrifice Ratio," Open Economies Review, Springer, pages 385-402.
    8. Down Ian, 2009. "Central Bank Independence, Disinflations and Monetary Policy," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, pages 1-22.
    9. Reiner Eichenberger & Sergio Rossi, 2004. "Die Deregulierung der Zentralbanken: Auf zu einem internationalen Markt für gute Geldpolitik!," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), pages 327-353.
    10. Amarasekara, Chandranath, 2008. "Have the Sacrifice Ratios Changed under Inflation Targeting? An Empirical Investigation," MPRA Paper 64867, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Giuseppe Diana & Mose Sidiropoulos, 2004. "Central Bank Independence, Speed of Disinflation and the Sacrifice Ratio," Open Economies Review, Springer, pages 385-402.
    12. Juncal Cunnado & Fernando PErez De Gracia, 2003. "Sacrifice Ratios: Some lessons from EMU countries, 1960-2001," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, pages 327-337.
    13. Juncal Cunado Eizaguirre & Fernando PÈrez de GracÌa Hidalgo, "undated". "Tasa de sacrificio en la UEM: Un an·lisis empÌrico," Studies on the Spanish Economy 70, FEDEA.
    14. Andrew Hallett & Jan Libich, 2012. "Explicit inflation targets and central bank independence: friends or foes?," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, pages 271-297.

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