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Have the Sacrifice Ratios Changed under Inflation Targeting? An Empirical Investigation

Listed author(s):
  • Amarasekara, Chandranath

Disinflation is a painful exercise: it reduces output and increases unemployment at least in the short run. This paper analyses the effects of adopting inflation targeting as a monetary policy framework in order to reduce inflation and maintain it at a low level, on this output or employment sacrifice. Using OECD data for several countries and several empirical methodologies, sacrifice ratios are measured. Several important results emerge: first, adopting of inflation targeting has not been an overnight shift but a gradual process; second, in industrial countries, inflation targeting has resulted in lower inflation as well as lower unemployment; however, the experience of some Eurozone economies as well as emerging market inflation targeters show that maintaining low and stable inflation could lead to adverse unemployment outcomes.

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File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/64867/1/Sacrifice_Ratios_Full.pdf
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 64867.

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Date of creation: 2008
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:64867
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  1. John M. Roberts, 2006. "Monetary Policy and Inflation Dynamics," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 2(3), September.
  2. Hutchison, M M & Walsh, C E, 1998. "The Output-Inflation Tradeoff and Central Bank Reform: Evidence from New Zealand," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(448), pages 703-725, May.
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  7. Carl E. Walsh, 2003. "Monetary Theory and Policy, 2nd Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 2, volume 1, number 0262232316, July.
  8. Ball, Laurence, 1995. "Disinflation with imperfect credibility," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 5-23, February.
  9. Taylor, John B, 1979. "Estimation and Control of a Macroeconomic Model with Rational Expectations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1267-1286, September.
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  12. Stephen G. Cecchetti & Alfonso Flores-Lagunes & Stefan Krause, 2006. "Has Monetary Policy become more Efficient? a Cross-Country Analysis," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(511), pages 408-433, 04.
  13. Ben S. Bernanke & Frederic S. Mishkin, 1997. "Inflation Targeting: A New Framework for Monetary Policy?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 97-116, Spring.
  14. Stephen G. Cecchetti & Kim, 2004. "Inflation Targeting, Price-Path Targeting, and Output Variability," NBER Chapters,in: The Inflation-Targeting Debate, pages 173-200 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Chorng-Huey Wong & Eric V. Clifton & Gene L. Leon, 2001. "Inflation Targeting and the Unemployment-Inflation Trade-off," IMF Working Papers 01/166, International Monetary Fund.
  16. Edmund S. Phelps, 1968. "Money-Wage Dynamics and Labor-Market Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 678-678.
  17. Alex Cukierman, 2002. "Does a Higher Sacrifice Ratio Mean that Central Bank Independence is Excessive?," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 3(1), pages 1-25, May.
  18. Grubb, David B. & Jackman, Richard & Layard, Richard, 1983. "Wage rigidity and unemployment in OECD countries," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 11-39.
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