Disinflation With Imperfect Credibility
This paper presents a theory of the real effects of disinflation. As in New Keynesian models, price adjustment is staggered across firms, As in New Classical models, credibility is imperfect: the monetary authority may not complete a promised disinflation. The combination of imperfect credibility and staggering yields more plausible results than either of these assumptions alone. In particular, an announced disinflation reduces expected output if credibility is sufficiently low.
|Date of creation:||Feb 1992|
|Publication status:||published as Journal of Monetary Economics, December 1994.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
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