IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/upadvr/v6715.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Cold Turkey vs. gradualism: Evidence on disinflation strategies from a laboratory experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Giamattei, Marcus

Abstract

Disinflation can be implemented gradually or via Cold Turkey - an immediate change of policy - with the latter being mainly recommended by theory and empirical literature. But Cold Turkey may only be superior because it is endogenously selected for favorable environments. To eliminate this endogeneity and to disentangle the credible push through of a disinflation policy from ex-ante credibility, I run an experiment where a central banker has to decide for a disinflationary strategy and four forecasters try to coordinate on it. The design abstracts from any rigidities and provides full information so that Cold Turkey is the Nash equilibrium. But Cold Turkey fails to be the most successful strategy because forecasters react sluggishly due to limited reasoning. Cold Turkey does not speed up learning or increase reasoning, is less successful and is reversed more often.

Suggested Citation

  • Giamattei, Marcus, 2015. "Cold Turkey vs. gradualism: Evidence on disinflation strategies from a laboratory experiment," Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe V-67-15, University of Passau, Faculty of Business and Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:upadvr:v6715
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/112718/1/829612521.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Guido Ascari & Christian Merkl, 2009. "Real Wage Rigidities and the Cost of Disinflations," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(2-3), pages 417-435, March.
    2. Collard, Fabrice & Fève, Patrick & Matheron, Julien, 2007. "The Dynamic Effects of Disinflation Policies," IDEI Working Papers 426, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    3. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
    4. Erceg, Christopher J. & Levin, Andrew T., 2003. "Imperfect credibility and inflation persistence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 915-944, May.
    5. Klaus Adam, 2007. "Experimental Evidence on the Persistence of Output and Inflation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(520), pages 603-636, April.
    6. Davis, Douglas D. & Holt, Charles a., 1993. "Experimental economics: Methods, problems and promise," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 8(2), pages 179-212.
    7. Agenor, Pierre-Richard & Taylor, Mark P, 1993. "Analysing Credibility in High-Inflation Countries: A New Approach," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(417), pages 329-336, March.
    8. Boschen, John F. & Weise, Charles L., 2001. "The Ex Ante Credibility of Disinflation Policy and the Cost of Reducing Inflation," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 323-347, July.
    9. Jordan, Thomas J., 1999. "Central bank independence and the sacrifice ratio," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 229-255, June.
    10. Christian Matthes & Argia M. Sbordone & Timothy Cogley, 2011. "Optimal Disinflation Under Learning," 2011 Meeting Papers 74, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    11. Thomas J. Sargent, 1982. "The Ends of Four Big Inflations," NBER Chapters,in: Inflation: Causes and Effects, pages 41-98 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Mervyn A. King, 1996. "How should central banks reduce inflation? - Conceptual issues," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Q IV, pages 25-52.
    13. Lambsdorff, Johann Graf & Schubert, Manuel & Giamattei, Marcus, 2013. "On the role of heuristics—Experimental evidence on inflation dynamics," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 1213-1229.
    14. Guth, Werner & Kocher, Martin & Sutter, Matthias, 2002. "Experimental 'beauty contests' with homogeneous and heterogeneous players and with interior and boundary equilibria," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 219-228, January.
    15. Duffy, John & Nagel, Rosemarie, 1997. "On the Robustness of Behaviour in Experimental "Beauty Contest" Games," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(445), pages 1684-1700, November.
    16. Robert Amano & Oleksiy Kryvtsov & Luba Petersen, 2014. "Recent Developments in Experimental Macroeconomics," Bank of Canada Review, Bank of Canada, vol. 2014(Autumn), pages 1-11.
    17. Romain Baeriswyl & Camille Cornand, 2014. "Reducing Overreaction To Central Banks' Disclosures: Theory And Experiment," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 1087-1126, August.
    18. Blanchard, Olivier J., 1985. "Credibility, disinflation and gradualism," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 211-217.
    19. Ernst Fehr & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2008. "Limited Rationality and Strategic Interaction: The Impact of the Strategic Environment on Nominal Inertia," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(2), pages 353-394, March.
    20. W. Wascher & Palle S. Andersen, 1999. "Sacrifice ratios and the conduct of monetary policy in conditions of low inflation," BIS Working Papers 82, Bank for International Settlements.
    21. Mankiw, N Gregory, 2001. "The Inexorable and Mysterious Tradeoff between Inflation and Unemployment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(471), pages 45-61, May.
    22. Aksoy, Yunus & Orphanides, Athanasios & Small, David & Wieland, Volker & Wilcox, David, 2006. "A quantitative exploration of the opportunistic approach to disinflation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(8), pages 1877-1893, November.
    23. Ball, Laurence, 1994. "Credible Disinflation with Staggered Price-Setting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 282-289, March.
    24. Peter N. Ireland, 1997. "Stopping inflations, big and small," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 759-782.
    25. Kurz, Mordecai & Piccillo, Giulia & Wu, Howei, 2013. "Modeling diverse expectations in an aggregated New Keynesian Model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 1403-1433.
    26. Goodfriend, Marvin & King, Robert G., 2005. "The incredible Volcker disinflation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(5), pages 981-1015, July.
    27. Mervyn A. King, 1996. "How should central banks reduce inflation? conceptual issues," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 53-91.
    28. Olivier Blanchard & Jordi Galí, 2007. "Real Wage Rigidities and the New Keynesian Model," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(s1), pages 35-65, February.
    29. Nagel, Rosemarie, 1995. "Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1313-1326, December.
    30. Ho, Teck-Hua & Camerer, Colin & Weigelt, Keith, 1998. "Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best Response in Experimental "p-Beauty Contests."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 947-969, September.
    31. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
    32. Laurence Ball, 1994. "What Determines the Sacrifice Ratio?," NBER Chapters,in: Monetary Policy, pages 155-193 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    33. Douglas D. Davis & Korenok Oleg, 2010. "Nominal Price Shocks in Monopolistically Competitive Markets: An Experimental Analysis," Working Papers 1003, VCU School of Business, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2011.
    34. Jim Engle-Warnick & Nurlan Turdaliev, 2010. "An experimental test of Taylor-type rules with inexperienced central bankers," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 13(2), pages 146-166, June.
    35. Alan S. Blinder & John Morgan, 2008. "Leadership in Groups: A Monetary Policy Experiment," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 4(4), pages 117-150, December.
    36. John Duffy & Frank Heinemann, 2016. "Central Bank Reputation, Cheap Talk and Transparency as Substitutes for Commitment: Experimental Evidence," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2016-053, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
    37. Ernst Baltensperger & Peter Kugler, 2000. "Central Bank Independence and Sacrifice Ratios: Some Further Considerations," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 111-125, April.
    38. George A. Akerlof & William T. Dickens & George L. Perry, 2000. "Near-Rational Wage and Price Setting and the Long-Run Phillips Curve," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 31(1), pages 1-60.
    39. Romain Baeriswyl & Camille Cornand, 2014. "Reducing Overreaction To Central Banks' Disclosures: Theory And Experiment," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 1087-1126, August.
    40. Cecchetti, Stephen G & Rich, Robert W, 2001. "Structural Estimates of the U.S. Sacrifice Ratio," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 19(4), pages 416-427, October.
    41. Blackburn, Keith & Christensen, Michael, 1989. "Monetary Policy and Policy Credibility: Theories and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(1), pages 1-45, March.
    42. Assenza, T. & Heemeijer, P. & Hommes, C.H. & Massaro, D., 2014. "Managing Self-organization of Expectations through Monetary Policy: a Macro Experiment," CeNDEF Working Papers 14-07, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance.
    43. Davis, Douglas & Korenok, Oleg, 2011. "Nominal shocks in monopolistically competitive markets: An experiment," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(6), pages 578-589.
    44. Ernst Fehr & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2001. "Does Money Illusion Matter?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1239-1262, December.
    45. Ascari, Guido & Rossi, Lorenza, 2011. "Real wage rigidities and disinflation dynamics: Calvo vs. Rotemberg pricing," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(2), pages 126-131, February.
    46. Daehwan Kim & Jung Inn Kim & Taeyoon Sung, 2013. "Stock market liberalization and price response: gradualism versus cold turkey," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(3), pages 273-285, January.
    47. Ireland, Peter N., 1995. "Optimal disinflationary paths," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 19(8), pages 1429-1448, November.
    48. Clare Lombardelli & James Proudman & James Talbot, 2005. "Committees Versus Individuals: An Experimental Analysis of Monetary Policy Decision-Making," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 1(1), May.
    49. Cooper, Russell & Haltiwanger, John, 1996. "Evidence on Macroeconomic Complementarities," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 78(1), pages 78-93, February.
    50. Jim Engle-Warnick & Nurlan Turdaliev, 2005. "An Experimental Test Of Taylor-Type Rules With Inexperienced Central Bankers," Macroeconomics 0511022, EconWPA.
    51. Anonymous, 1994. "Monetary Policy Statement, December 1994," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 57, December.
    52. Anonymous, 1994. "Six monthly Monetary Policy Statement June 1994," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 57, June.
    53. Milani, Fabio, 2007. "Expectations, learning and macroeconomic persistence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(7), pages 2065-2082, October.
    54. Orphanides, Athanasios & Wilcox, David W, 2002. "The Opportunistic Approach to Disinflation," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(1), pages 47-71, Spring.
    55. Ricciuti, Roberto, 2008. "Bringing macroeconomics into the lab," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 216-237, March.
    56. Michael W. M. Roos & Wolfgang J. Luhan, 2013. "Information, Learning and Expectations in an Experimental Model Economy," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 80(319), pages 513-531, July.
    57. J. Benson Durham, 2001. "Sacrifice ratios and monetary policy credibility: do smaller budget deficits, inflation-indexed debt, and inflation targets lower disinflation costs?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2001-47, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    58. Posen, Adam, 1998. "Central Bank Independence and Disinflationary Credibility: A Missing Link?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 335-359, July.
    59. repec:eme:rexezz:s0193-230620140000017003 is not listed on IDEAS
    60. Andrew J. Filardo, 1998. "New evidence on the output cost of fighting inflation," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Q III.
    61. Hommes, Cars, 2011. "The heterogeneous expectations hypothesis: Some evidence from the lab," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 1-24, January.
    62. Sutan, Angela & Willinger, Marc, 2009. "Guessing with negative feedback: An experiment," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 1123-1133, May.
    63. Giuseppe Diana & Mose Sidiropoulos, 2004. "Central Bank Independence, Speed of Disinflation and the Sacrifice Ratio," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 385-402, October.
    64. Andreas M. Fischer, 1997. "Do Institutional Factors Matter for the Speed of Disinflation?," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 133(III), pages 539-556, September.
    65. Taylor, John B, 1983. "Union Wage Settlements during a Disinflation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(5), pages 981-993, December.
    66. John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman, 1989. "Limited Rationality and Strategic Complements: The Implications for Macroeconomics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 104(3), pages 463-483.
    67. Eric Schaling & Marco Hoeberichts, 2010. "Why Speed Doesn’t Kill: Learning to Believe in Disinflation," De Economist, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 23-42, April.
    68. Alan S. Blinder, 2000. "Central-Bank Credibility: Why Do We Care? How Do We Build It?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1421-1431, December.
    69. Dani Rodrik, 1989. "Credibility of Trade Reform — a Policy Maker's Guide," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 1-16, March.
    70. Robert J. Gordon, 1982. "Why Stopping Inflation May Be Costly: Evidence from Fourteen Historical Episodes," NBER Chapters,in: Inflation: Causes and Effects, pages 11-40 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    71. Spermann, Alexander, 2006. "Basic Income Reform in Germany: Better Gradualism than Cold Turkey," ZEW Discussion Papers 06-064, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    72. Shane Frederick, 2005. "Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(4), pages 25-42, Fall.
    73. Lawrence Huiyan Zhang, 2005. "Sacrifice Ratios with Long-Lived Effects," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(2), pages 231-262, August.
    74. Eric Schaling & Marco Hoeberichts, 2010. "Why Speed Doesn’t Kill: Learning to Believe in Disinflation," Working Papers 164, Economic Research Southern Africa.
    75. Pfajfar, D. & Zakelj, B., 2011. "Inflation Expectations and Monetary Policy Design : Evidence from the Laboratory (Replaces CentER DP 2009-007)," Discussion Paper 2011-091, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    76. Greiner, Ben, 2004. "An Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments," MPRA Paper 13513, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    77. Roos, Michael W. M. & Luhan, Wolfgang J., 2008. "Are Expectations Formed by the Anchoring-and-adjustment Heuristic? – An Experimental Investigation," Ruhr Economic Papers 54, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    78. repec:pit:wpaper:334 is not listed on IDEAS
    79. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Social Value of Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1521-1534, December.
    80. Blinder, Alan S & Morgan, John, 2005. "Are Two Heads Better than One? Monetary Policy by Committee," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(5), pages 789-811, October.
    81. repec:nsr:niesrd:308 is not listed on IDEAS
    82. Alan S. Blinder, 1997. "Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: What Central Bankers Could Learn from Academics--And Vice Versa," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 3-19, Spring.
    83. Loh Sanguck, 2002. "A Cold-Turkey versus a Gradualist Approach in a Menu Cost Model," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-19, March.
    84. Thomas Jordan, 1997. "Disinflation costs, accelerating inflation gains, and central bank independence," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 133(1), pages 1-21, March.
    85. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Disinflation; Credibility; Cold Turkey; Gradualism; Limited Reasoning; Endogenous Treatments;

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:upadvr:v6715. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/fwpasde.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.