IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/openec/v11y2000i2p111-125.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Central Bank Independence and Sacrifice Ratios: Some Further Considerations

Author

Listed:
  • Ernst Baltensperger
  • Peter Kugler

    ()

Abstract

The existing literature reports a positive relationship between sacrifice ratios and central bank independence. This paper discusses two critical points related to the usual procedures employed by this literature. One concerns the issue of non-stationarity of the inflation rate, the other the problem of correlation between the error terms for different disinflation episodes in the same country. The way in which the sacrifice ratio-central bank independence relationship is tested is reconsidered taking into account these points. Our results shed considerable doubts on the nature and robustness of such a relationship and on the usual interpretation given to it in the literature. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000

Suggested Citation

  • Ernst Baltensperger & Peter Kugler, 2000. "Central Bank Independence and Sacrifice Ratios: Some Further Considerations," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 111-125, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:openec:v:11:y:2000:i:2:p:111-125
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1008309303922
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1008309303922
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Laurence Ball, 1994. "What Determines the Sacrifice Ratio?," NBER Chapters,in: Monetary Policy, pages 155-193 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Perron, Pierre, 1997. "Further evidence on breaking trend functions in macroeconomic variables," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 355-385, October.
    3. Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994. "How independent should a central bank be?," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, vol. 38, pages 195-225.
    4. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-162, May.
    5. Andreas Fischer, 1996. "Central bank independence and sacrifice ratios," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 5-18, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Giamattei, Marcus, 2015. "Cold Turkey vs. gradualism: Evidence on disinflation strategies from a laboratory experiment," Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe V-67-15, University of Passau, Faculty of Business and Economics.
    2. Miguel Ricardo Rueda R., 2008. "Breaking Credibility in Monetary Policy: The Role of Politics in the Stability of the Central Banker," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1627, Inter-American Development Bank.
    3. Coffinet, J., 2006. "Ratios de sacrifice et rigidités sur le marché du travail," Bulletin de la Banque de France, Banque de France, issue 151, pages 59-73.
    4. repec:kap:iaecre:v:12:y:2006:i:3:p:287-297 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. J. Benson Durham, 2001. "Sacrifice ratios and monetary policy credibility: do smaller budget deficits, inflation-indexed debt, and inflation targets lower disinflation costs?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2001-47, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    6. Giuseppe Diana & Mose Sidiropoulos, 2004. "Central Bank Independence, Speed of Disinflation and the Sacrifice Ratio," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 385-402, October.
    7. Winston R. MOORE, 2009. "Do International Monetary Fund Programs Impact On The Sacrifice Ratio?," The Developing Economies, Institute of Developing Economies, vol. 47(2), pages 202-219.
    8. Down Ian, 2009. "Central Bank Independence, Disinflations and Monetary Policy," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(3), pages 1-22, January.
    9. Miguel Rueda, 2008. "Breaking Credibility in Monetary Policy: The Role of Politics in the Stability of the Central Banker," Research Department Publications 4585, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    10. Reiner Eichenberger & Sergio Rossi, 2004. "Die Deregulierung der Zentralbanken: Auf zu einem internationalen Markt für gute Geldpolitik!," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 140(III), pages 327-353, September.
    11. Miguel Rueda, 2008. "Credibilidad en la política monetaria: Papel de políticas en la estabilidad del Presidente del Banco Central," Research Department Publications 4586, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    12. Giuseppe Diana & MoÏse Sidiropoulos, 2006. "Central Bank Independence and the Cost of Disinflation: Why the Wage Contracts Length Matters?," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 12(3), pages 287-297, August.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:openec:v:11:y:2000:i:2:p:111-125. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.