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Does Instrument Independence Matter under the Constrained Discretionof an Inflation Targeting Goal? Lessons from UK Taylor Rule Empirics

  • Alexander Mihailov

    (University of Essex)

We investigate whether increased independence affects central bank behavior when monetary policy is already in an inflation targeting regime. Taking advantage of the recent UK experience to identify such an exogenous change, we estimate Taylor rules via alternative methods, specifications and proxies. Our contribution is to detect two novel results: the Bank of England has responded to the output gap, not growth; and in a stronger way after receiving operational independence. Both findings are consistent with the Bank's mandate and New Keynesian monetary theory. Economic expansion and anchored inflation have thus complemented greater autonomy in influencing the Bank's policy feedback

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File URL: http://repec.org/mmf2006/up.31492.1145617453.pdf
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Paper provided by Money Macro and Finance Research Group in its series Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2006 with number 95.

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Date of creation: 02 Feb 2007
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Handle: RePEc:mmf:mmfc06:95
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.essex.ac.uk/afm/mmf/index.html

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