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Strategies for Controlling Inflation

In: Monetary Policy and Inflation Targeting

  • Frederic S Mishkin

    (Federal Reserve Bank of New York)

This paper examines what strategies policymakers have used to both reduce and control inflation. It first outlines why a consensus has emerged that inflation needs to be controlled. Then it examines four basic strategies: exchange rate pegging, monetary targeting, inflation targeting, and the just do it' strategy of preemptive monetary policy with no explicit nominal anchor. The discussion highlights the advantages and disadvantages of each strategy and sheds light not only on how disinflation might best be achieved, but also on how hard won gains in lowering inflation can be locked in.

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This chapter was published in: Philip Lowe (ed.) Monetary Policy and Inflation Targeting, Reserve Bank of Australia, pages , 1997.
This item is provided by Reserve Bank of Australia in its series RBA Annual Conference Volume with number acv1997-02.
Handle: RePEc:rba:rbaacv:acv1997-02
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