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The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective

  • Clarida, Richard
  • Galí, Jordi
  • Gertler, Mark

This paper reviews the recent literature on monetary policy rules. We exposit the monetary policy design problem within a simple baseline theoretical framework. We then consider the implications of adding various real world complications. Among other things, we show that the optimal policy implicitly incorporates inflation targeting. We also characterize the gains from making credible commitments to fight inflation. In contrast to conventional wisdom, we show that gains from commitment may emerge even if the central bank is not trying to inadvisedly push output above its natural level. We also consider the implications of frictions such as imperfect information.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 2139.

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Date of creation: May 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2139
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  1. N. Gregory Mankiw, 2006. "The Macroeconomist as Scientist and Engineer," NBER Working Papers 12349, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Erceg, Christopher J. & Levin, Andrew T., 2003. "Imperfect credibility and inflation persistence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 915-944, May.
  3. Damjanovic, Tatiana & Damjanovic, Vladislav & Nolan, Charles, 2008. "Unconditionally optimal monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 491-500, April.
  4. Stefan Krause, 2003. "Optimal Monetary Policy and the Equivalency between the One-period AD-AS Model and the Forward-looking New Keynesian Model," Emory Economics 0317, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta).
  5. Yongsung Chang & Mark Bils, 2002. "Welfare Costs of Sticky Wages When Effort Can Respond," Macroeconomics 0204003, EconWPA.
  6. Giorgio Fagiolo & Andrea Roventini, 2008. "On the Scientific Status of Economic Policy: A Tale of Alternative Paradigms," LEM Papers Series 2008/03, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
  7. Allen Head & Lucy Qian Liu & Guido Menzio & Randall Wright, 2011. "Sticky prices: a new monetarist approach," Working Papers 690, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  8. Ben S. Bernanke & Jean Boivin, 2001. "Monetary Policy in a Data-Rich Environment," NBER Working Papers 8379, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Teruyoshi Kobayashi, 2005. "Optimal monetary policy and the role of hybrid inflation-price-level targets," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(18), pages 2119-2125.
  10. Eckhard Hein & Christian Schoder, 2011. "Interest rates, distribution and capital accumulation -- A post-Kaleckian perspective on the US and Germany," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(6), pages 693-723, November.
  11. Leitemo, Kai & Söderström, Ulf, 2004. "Robust Monetary Policy in the New-Keynesian Framework," CEPR Discussion Papers 4805, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Gauti B. Eggertsson, 2008. "Great Expectations and the End of the Depression," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1476-1516, September.
  13. Peter Tillmann, 2012. "Has Inflation Persistence Changed under EMU?," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 13(1), pages 86-102, 02.
  14. Shouyong Shi, 2006. "A Microfoundation of Monetary Economics," Working Papers tecipa-211, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  15. Traficante, Guido, 2013. "Monetary policy, parameter uncertainty and welfare," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 73-80.
  16. Dufour, Jean-Marie & Khalaf, Lynda & Kichian, Maral, 2013. "Identification-robust analysis of DSGE and structural macroeconomic models," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 340-350.
  17. Mahir Binici & Yin-Wong Cheung, 2011. "Exchange Rate Dynamics Under Alternative Optimal Interest Rate Rules," Working Papers 362011, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.
  18. Montserrat Ferré, 2005. "Should Fiscal Authorities Co-operate in a Monetary Union with Public Deficit Targets?," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(3), pages 539-550, 09.
  19. Junhan Kim, 2011. "Inflation Targeting as Constrained Discretion," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43(7), pages 1505-1522, October.
  20. Jensen, Christian, 2013. "The gains from short-term commitments," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 14-23.
  21. Pavel Kapinos & Michael S. Hanson, 2013. "Targets In The Taylor Rule: Inflation, Speed Limit, Or Price Level?," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 31(1), pages 176-190, 01.
  22. Paez-Farrell, Juan, 2012. "Should central bankers discount the future? A note," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 20-22.
  23. Waltraud Schelkle & Anke Hassel, 2012. "The Policy Consensus Ruling European Political Economy: The Political Attractions of Discredited Economics," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 3, pages 16-27, December.
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