IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Flexible Rules cum Constrained Discretion: A New Consensus in Monetary Policy

  • Philip Arestis

    ()

    (Department of Land Economy, University of Cambridge)

  • Alexander Mihailov

    ()

    (Department of Economics, University of Reading)

This paper demonstrates that recent influential contributions to monetary policy imply an emerging consensus whereby neither rigid rules nor complete discretion are found optimal. Instead, middle-ground monetary regimes based on rules (operative under ‘normal’ circumstances) to anchor inflation expectations over the long run, but designed with enough flexibility to mitigate the short-run effect of shocks (with communicated discretion in ‘exceptional’ circumstances temporarily overriding these rules), are gaining support in theoretical models and policy formulation and implementation. The opposition of ‘rules versus discretion’ has, thus, reappeared as the synthesis of ‘rules cum discretion’, in essence as inflation-forecast targeting.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.reading.ac.uk/nmsruntime/saveasdialog.asp?lID=17409&sID=59484
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Henley Business School, Reading University in its series Economic Analysis Research Group Working Papers with number earg-wp2007-13.

as
in new window

Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:rdg:eargwp:earg-wp2007-13
Contact details of provider: Postal: PO Box 218, Whiteknights, Reading, Berks, RG6 6AA
Phone: +44 (0) 118 378 8226
Fax: +44 (0) 118 975 0236
Web page: http://www.henley.reading.ac.uk/

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Arestis, Philip & Caporale, Guglielmo Maria & Cipollini, Andrea, 2002. "Does Inflation Targeting Affect the Trade-Off between Output Gap and Inflation Variability?," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 70(4), pages 528-45, Special I.
  2. Aubhik Khan & Robert G. King & Alexander L. Wolman, 2001. "Optimal monetary policy," Working Papers 01-5, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  3. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1972. "Expectations and the neutrality of money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 103-124, April.
  4. Giuseppe Fontana & Alfonso Palacio- Vera, 2005. "Are Long-Run Price Stability and Short-run Output Stabilization All that Monetary Policy Can Aim For?," Macroeconomics 0511024, EconWPA.
  5. Mark Gertler & Jordi Gali & Richard Clarida, 1999. "The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1661-1707, December.
  6. Alvaro Angeriz & Philip Arestis, 2008. "Assessing inflation targeting through intervention analysis," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(2), pages 293-317, April.
  7. Svensson, Lars E. O., 1997. "Inflation forecast targeting: Implementing and monitoring inflation targets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(6), pages 1111-1146, June.
  8. Vega, Marco & Winkelried, Diego, 2004. "Inflation Targeting and Inflation Behavior: A Successful Story?," MPRA Paper 838, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Athey, Susan & Atkeson, Andrew & Kehoe, Patrick J., 2004. "The optimal degree of discretion in monetary policy," Working Paper Series 0338, European Central Bank.
  10. N. Gregory Mankiw, 2006. "The Macroeconomist as Scientist and Engineer," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 20(4), pages 29-46, Fall.
  11. Philip Arestis & Malcolm Sawyer, 2004. "On the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy and of Fiscal Policy," Review of Social Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 62(4), pages 441-463.
  12. Svensson, Lars E O, 1998. "Inflation Targeting as a Monetary Policy Rule," CEPR Discussion Papers 1998, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-67, March.
  14. Calvo, Guillermo A., 1983. "Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 383-398, September.
  15. Faust, Jon & Svensson, Lars E O, 2001. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(2), pages 369-97, May.
  16. Calvo, Guillermo A, 1978. "On the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(6), pages 1411-28, November.
  17. Lohmann, Susanne, 1992. "Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 273-86, March.
  18. Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Hoeberichts, Marco, 2002. "Central Bank Accountability and Transparency: Theory and Some Evidence," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(1), pages 73-96, Spring.
  19. Robert King & Alexander L. Wolman, 1999. "What Should the Monetary Authority Do When Prices Are Sticky?," NBER Chapters, in: Monetary Policy Rules, pages 349-404 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  20. Jean-Pierre DANTHINE, 1997. "In Search of a Successor to IS-LM," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 9710, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  21. Bernanke, Ben S & Woodford, Michael, 1997. "Inflation Forecasts and Monetary Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(4), pages 653-84, November.
  22. Herrendorf, Berthold, 1998. "Inflation Targeting as a Way of Precommitment," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 431-48, July.
  23. Benjamin M. Friedman, 2006. "The Greenspan Era: Discretion, Rather than Rules," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 174-177, May.
  24. Taylor, John B., 1993. "Discretion versus policy rules in practice," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 195-214, December.
  25. Marvin Goodfriend, 2007. "How the World Achieved Consensus on Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 13580, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  26. Nancy L. Stokey, 2003. ""Rules vs. Discretion" After Twenty-Five Years," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2002, Volume 17, pages 9-64 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  27. Lucas, Robert Jr. & Stokey, Nancy L., 1983. "Optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 55-93.
  28. Philip Arestis & Malcolm Sawyer, 2003. "Inflation Targeting: A Critical Appraisal," Macroeconomics 0309015, EconWPA.
  29. Giuseppe Fontana, 2006. "“Mr Keynes and the ‘Classics’” Again: A Methodological Enquiry," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 34(2), pages 161-174, June.
  30. Alexander Mihailov, 2005. "Operational Independence, Inflation Targeting and UK Monetary Policy," Economics Discussion Papers 602, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
  31. King, Robert G. & Plosser, Charles I., 2005. "The econometrics of the New Keynesian price equation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(6), pages 1059-1060, September.
  32. Philip Arestis & Alexander Mihailov, 2011. "Classifying Monetary Economics: Fields And Methods From Past To Future," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(4), pages 769-800, 09.
  33. Persson , Mats & Persson , Torsten & Svensson, Lars E.O., 2004. "Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary Policy: A Solution," Seminar Papers 734, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
  34. Alvaro Angeriz & Philip Arestis, 2006. "Has inflation targeting had any impact on inflation?," Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 28(4), pages 559-571, July.
  35. Lars E. O. Svensson, 2003. "What is Wrong with Taylor Rules? Using Judgment in Monetary Policy through Targeting Rules," NBER Working Papers 9421, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  36. Mankiw, N. Gregory & Reis, Ricardo, 2003. "What Measure of Inflation Should a Central Bank Target?," Scholarly Articles 3415322, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  37. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1981. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model," NBER Working Papers 0807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  38. William Poole, 1969. "Optimal choice of monetary policy instruments in a simple stochastic macro model," Special Studies Papers 2, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  39. Michael Woodford, 2001. "The Taylor Rule and Optimal Monetary Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 232-237, May.
  40. Archer, David J., 1997. "The New Zealand approach to rules and discretion in monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 3-15, June.
  41. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
  42. Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994. "How independent should a central bank be?," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, vol. 38, pages 195-225.
  43. Alberto Alesina, 1988. "Macroeconomics and Politics," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1988, Volume 3, pages 13-62 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  44. Marvin Goodfriend & Robert King, 1997. "The New Neoclassical Synthesis and the Role of Monetary Policy," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1997, Volume 12, pages 231-296 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  45. Lars E.O. Svensson & Robert J. Tetlow, 2005. "Optimal policy projections," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2005-34, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  46. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
  47. McCallum, Bennett T., 1997. "Crucial issues concerning central bank independence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 99-112, June.
  48. Alvaro Angeriz & Philip Arestis, 2007. "Monetary policy in the UK," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 31(6), pages 863-884, November.
  49. Ben S. Bernanke & Frederic S. Mishkin, 1997. "Inflation Targeting: A New Framework for Monetary Policy?," NBER Working Papers 5893, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  50. Canzoneri, Matthew B, 1985. "Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1056-70, December.
  51. Woodford, Michael, 1995. "Price-level determinacy without control of a monetary aggregate," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 1-46, December.
  52. Alexander Mihailov, 2005. "Has More Independence Affected Bank of England's Reaction Function under Inflation Targeting? Lessons from Taylor Rule Empirics," Economics Discussion Papers 601, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
  53. Giuseppe Fontana, 2007. "Why money matters: Wicksell, Keynes, and the new consensus view on monetary policy," Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 30(1), pages 43-60, October.
  54. Sargent, Thomas J & Wallace, Neil, 1975. ""Rational" Expectations, the Optimal Monetary Instrument, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(2), pages 241-54, April.
  55. S. G. B Henry & A. R. Pagan, 2004. "The Econometrics of the New Keynesian Policy Model: Introduction," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 66(s1), pages 581-607, 09.
  56. Marvin Goodfriend, 1985. "Monetary mystique : secrecy and central banking," Working Paper 85-07, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  57. D Nocetti, 2007. "Optimal Monetary Policy under Risk and Uncertainty," Economic Issues Journal Articles, Economic Issues, vol. 12(1), pages 93-108, March.
  58. repec:fth:harver:1470 is not listed on IDEAS
  59. M. Woodford., 2010. "Convergence in Macroeconomics: Elements of the New Synthesis," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 10.
  60. Forder, James, 1998. "Central Bank Independence--Conceptual Clarifications and Interim Assessment," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 307-34, July.
  61. N. Gregory Mankiw, 1990. "A Quick Refresher Course in Macroeconomics," NBER Working Papers 3256, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  62. Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981, June.
  63. Jesús Crespo Cuaresma & Ernest Gnan, 2007. "The natural rate of interest: which concept? which estimation method? which policy conclusions?," Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 29(4), pages 667-688, July.
  64. Söderström, Ulf & Söderlind, Paul & Vredin, Anders, 2002. "New-Keynesian Models and Monetary Policy: A Reexamination of the Stylized Facts," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 511, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 15 Aug 2003.
  65. Lucas, Robert Jr, 1976. "Econometric policy evaluation: A critique," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 19-46, January.
  66. James Forder, 2001. "The Theory of Credibility and the Reputation-bias of Policy," Review of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(1), pages 5-25.
  67. Servaas Storm & C. W. M. Naastepad, 2007. "It is high time to ditch the NAIRU," Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 29(4), pages 531-554, July.
  68. Benjamin M. Friedman, 2006. "The Greenspan Era: Discretion, Rather Than Rules," NBER Working Papers 12118, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  69. F Alexandre & P Bacao, 2006. "Investment and Non-fundamental Movements in Asset Prices: is there a role for monetary policy?," Economic Issues Journal Articles, Economic Issues, vol. 11(1), pages 65-95, March.
  70. Carl E. Walsh, 2003. "Monetary Theory and Policy, 2nd Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 2, volume 1, number 0262232316, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rdg:eargwp:earg-wp2007-13. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ed Quick)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.