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Operational independence, inflation targeting, and UK monetary policy

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  • ALEXANDER MIHAILOV

Abstract

This paper evaluates empirically the feedback and stance of monetary policy in the United Kingdom under inflation targeting, implemented since October 1992. Its principal contribution is in comparing two subsamples, before the Bank of England was granted operational independence in May 1997 and after that. We find that the operational independence subperiod has differed from the preindependence one in terms of a weaker response to inflation but stronger sensitivity to the output gap and a less restrictive stance of monetary policy. Such behavior appears justified given the Bank's mandate and the evolution of the business cycle.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander Mihailov, 2006. "Operational independence, inflation targeting, and UK monetary policy," Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(3), pages 395-421.
    • Handle: RePEc:mes:postke:v:28:y:2006:i:3:p:395-421
    DOI: 10.2753/PKE0160-3477280302
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    Cited by:

    1. P Arestis & A Mihailov, 2009. "Flexible Rules cum Constrained Discretion: A New Consensus in Monetary Policy," Economic Issues Journal Articles, Economic Issues, vol. 14(2), pages 27-54, September.
    2. Stephen McKnight & Alexander Mihailov, 2015. "Do Real Balance Effects Invalidate the Taylor Principle in Closed and Open Economies?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 82(328), pages 938-975, October.
    3. Yu Chen & Apostolos Serletis, 2025. "Monetary Policy Strategies in Advanced and Emerging Economies," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 1-23, February.
    4. Mihailov, Alexander, 2005. "Has more Independence Affected Bank of England's Reaction Function under Inflation Targeting? Lessons from Taylor Rule Empirics," Economics Discussion Papers 8894, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    5. Enrico Sergio Levrero, 2022. "The Taylor Rule and its Aftermath: Elements for an Interpretation along Classical-Keynesian lines," Centro Sraffa Working Papers CSWP59, Centro di Ricerche e Documentazione 'Piero Sraffa'.
    6. Kevin Lee & Nilss Olekalns & Kalvinder Shields, 2013. "Meta Taylor Rules for the UK and Australia; Accommodating Regime Uncertainty in Monetary Policy Analysis Using Model Averaging Methods," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 81, pages 28-53, October.
    7. repec:rdg:wpaper:em-dp2007-53 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Anh Dinh Minh Nguyen, 2017. "U.K. Monetary Policy under Inflation Targeting," Bank of Lithuania Working Paper Series 41, Bank of Lithuania.
    9. Zhu, Sheng & Kavanagh, Ella & O'Sullivan, Niall, 2021. "Uncovering the implicit short-term inflation target of the Bank of England," International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 120-135.
    10. Aleksandra Maslowska, 2009. "Using Taylor Rule to Explain Effects of Institutional Changes in Central Banks," Discussion Papers 46, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    11. Mihailov, Alexander & Ullrich, Katrin, 2007. "Independence and Accountability of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Committees," ZEW Discussion Papers 07-044, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    12. Baker, Andrew, 2015. "The bankers’ paradox: the political economy of macroprudential regulation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 61998, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

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