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Flexible Rules cum Constrained Discretion: A New Consensus in Monetary Policy

Author

Listed:
  • Philip Arestis

    (Department of Land Economy, University of Cambridge)

  • Alexander Mihailov

    (Department of Economics, University of Reading)

Abstract

This paper demonstrates that recent influential contributions to monetary policy imply an emerging consensus whereby neither rigid rules nor complete discretion are found optimal. Instead, middle-ground monetary regimes based on rules (operative under 'normal' circumstances) to anchor inflation expectations over the long run, but designed with enough flexibility to mitigate the short-run effect of shocks (with communicated discretion in 'exceptional' circumstances temporarily overriding these rules), are gaining support in theoretical models and policy formulation and implementation. The opposition of 'rules versus discretion' has, thus, reappeared as the synthesis of 'rules cum discretion', in essence as inflation-forecast targeting.

Suggested Citation

  • Philip Arestis & Alexander Mihailov, 2007. "Flexible Rules cum Constrained Discretion: A New Consensus in Monetary Policy," Economics Discussion Papers em-dp2007-53, Department of Economics, University of Reading.
    • Handle: RePEc:rdg:emxxdp:em-dp2007-53
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. David Aikman & Andrew Haldane & Marc Hinterschweiger & Sujit Kapadia, 2018. "Rethinking financial stability," Bank of England working papers 712, Bank of England.
    2. Peter J. Boettke & Alexander W. Salter & Daniel J. Smith, 2018. "Money as meta-rule: Buchanan’s constitutional economics as a foundation for monetary stability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 176(3), pages 529-555, September.
    3. Etienne Farvaque & Muhammad Azmat Hayat & Alexander Mihailov, 2017. "Who Supports the ECB? Evidence from Eurobarometer Survey Data," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(4), pages 654-677, April.
    4. Andrew Clark & Alexander Mihailov & Michael Zargham, 2024. "Complex Systems Modeling of Community Inclusion Currencies," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 64(2), pages 1259-1294, August.
    5. Paul Sanderson & David Seidl & John Roberts, 2013. "The Limits of Flexible Regulation: Managers' Perceptions of Corporate Governance Codes and 'Comply-or-Explain'," Working Papers wp439, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    6. Josep Ferret Mas & Alexander Mihailov, 2021. "Green Quantitative Easing as Intergenerational Climate Justice: On Political Theory and Pareto Efficiency in Reversing Now Human-Caused Environmental Damage," Economics Discussion Papers em-dp2021-16, Department of Economics, University of Reading.
    7. Philip Arestis & Alexander Mihailov, 2011. "Classifying Monetary Economics: Fields And Methods From Past To Future," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(4), pages 769-800, September.
    8. Pudner, Damian, 2025. "Rethinking Monetary Policy: The case for adopting NGDP targeting in Britain," IEA Discussion Papers 136, Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA).
    9. Singleton,John, 2010. "Central Banking in the Twentieth Century," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521899093, Enero-Abr.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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