Central bank independence and sacrifice ratios
Do countries with independent central banks enjoy lower output costs during disinflation? Credibility should allow independent central banks to adjust quicker and thereby suffer lower output costs. The objective of this study is to test the credibility hypothesis that countries with independent central banks suffer lower output losses over a disinflationary cycle than do countries with less independent central banks. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996
References listed on IDEAS
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- Cukierman, Alex & Kalaitzidakis, Pantelis & Summers, Lawrence H. & Webb, Steven B., 1993. "Central bank independence, growth, investment, and real rates," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 95-140, December.
- Laurence Ball, 1993.
"What Determines the Sacrifice Ratio?,"
NBER Working Papers
4306, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- G. K. Shaw, 1988. "Keynesian Economics," Books, Edward Elgar, number 406.
- David Romer, 1993. "Openness and Inflation: Theory and Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 108(4), pages 869-903.
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