Central bank independence and sacrifice ratios
Do countries with independent central banks enjoy lower output costs during disinflation? Credibility should allow independent central banks to adjust quicker and thereby suffer lower output costs. The objective of this study is to test the credibility hypothesis that countries with independent central banks suffer lower output losses over a disinflationary cycle than do countries with less independent central banks. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996
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Volume (Year): 7 (1996)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Cukierman, Alex & Kalaitzidakis, Pantelis & Summers, Lawrence H. & Webb, Steven B., 1993. "Central bank independence, growth, investment, and real rates," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 95-140, December.
- Laurence Ball, 1994.
"What Determines the Sacrifice Ratio?,"
in: Monetary Policy, pages 155-193
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Laurence Ball, 1993. "What determines the sacrifice ratio?," Working Papers 93-21, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Laurence Ball, 1993. "What Determines the Sacrifice Ratio?," NBER Working Papers 4306, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- David Romer, 1993. "Openness and Inflation: Theory and Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 108(4), pages 869-903.
- David Romer, 1991. "Openness and inflation: theory and evidence," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Nov.
- David Romer, 1991. "Openness and Inflation: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 3936, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- G. K. Shaw, 1988. "Keynesian Economics," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 406.
- Berger, Helge & de Haan, Jakob & Eijffinger, Sylvester C W, 2001. " Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(1), pages 3-40, February.
- Berger, Helge & de Haan, Jakob & Eijffinger, Sylvester C W, 2000. "Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 2353, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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