Central Bank Credibility: Why Do We Care? How Do We Build It?
Central bank credibility plays a pivotal role in much of the modern literature on monetary policy, yet it is difficult to measure or even assess objectively. A survey of central bankers was conducted to determine their attitudes on two important issues: why credibility matters, and how credibility can be built. The central bankers' answers are compared with the responses of NBER-affiliated macro and monetary economists. The two groups agree much more than they disagree. They are particularly united in their evaluations of ways to make a central bank credible -- assigning high ratings to the central bank's track record and low ratings to theoretical ideas like precommitment and incentive-compatible contracts.
|Date of creation:||Jun 1999|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as Blinder, A. S. "Central-Bank Credibility: Why Do We Care? How Do We Build It?," American Economic Review, 2000, v90(5,Dec), 1421-1431.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Adam Posen, 1995.
"Central bank independence and disinflationary credibility: a missing link?,"
1, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
- Posen, Adam, 1998. "Central Bank Independence and Disinflationary Credibility: A Missing Link?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 335-59, July.
- N. Gregory Mankiw, 1994. "Monetary Policy," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number greg94-1, October.
- Taylor, John B, 1983.
"Union Wage Settlements during a Disinflation,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 73(5), pages 981-93, December.
- Laurence Ball, 1994.
"What Determines the Sacrifice Ratio?,"
in: Monetary Policy, pages 155-193
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Thomas J. Sargent, 1982.
"The Ends of Four Big Inflations,"
in: Inflation: Causes and Effects, pages 41-98
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ben S. Bernanke & Frederic S. Mishkin, 1997.
"Inflation Targeting: A New Framework for Monetary Policy?,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
American Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 97-116, Spring.
- Ben S. Bernanke & Frederic S. Mishkin, 1997. "Inflation Targeting: A New Framework for Monetary Policy?," NBER Working Papers 5893, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Laurence Ball, 1991.
"The Genesis of Inflation and the Costs of Disinflation,"
NBER Working Papers
3621, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Laurence Ball, 1991. "The genesis of inflation and the costs of disinflation," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 439-461.
- Ball, Laurence, 1991. "The Genesis of Inflation and the Costs of Disinflation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 23(3), pages 439-52, August.
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1993. "Designing institutions for monetary stability," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 53-84, December.
- Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983.
"A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
- Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1981. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model," NBER Working Papers 0807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
- Alan S. Blinder, 1999. "Central Banking in Theory and Practice," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262522608, June.
- Marvin Goodfriend, 1985.
"Monetary mystique : secrecy and central banking,"
85-07, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
- Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-67, March.
- Guy Debelle, 1996. "The Ends of Three Small Inflations: Australia, New Zealand and Canada," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 22(1), pages 56-78, March.
- Backus, David & Driffill, John, 1985. "Rational Expectations and Policy Credibility Following a Change in Regime," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(2), pages 211-21, April.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:7161. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.