Committees versus individuals: an experimental analysis of monetary policy decision-making
We report the results of an experimental analysis of monetary policy decision-making under uncertainty. A large sample of economically literate students from the London School of Economics played a simple monetary policy game, as both individuals and committees of five players. Our findings - that groups make better decisions than individuals - accord with previous work by Blinder and Morgan. The experiment also attempted to establish why group decision-making is superior: although some improvement was related to committees taking decisions by majority voting, a significant additional committee benefit was associated with members being able to share information and observe each other's voting behaviour.
|Date of creation:||04 Jun 2003|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +44 1334 462479
Web page: http://www.res.org.uk/society/annualconf.asp
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecj:ac2003:142. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.