The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence
It is often argued that a high level of central-band independence coupled with an explicit mandate that the bank aim for price stability are important institutional devices for maintaining that stability. Indeed, a number of countries have recently increased the independence of their central banks in order to raise their commitment to price stability.
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|Date of creation:||1996|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: International Finance Section, Department of Economics Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, U.S.A|
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