Market Discipline and Monetary Policy
The effects of forward looking expectations of future inflation on equilibrium inflation and interest rates are examined within an imperfect information framework. Expectations of future inflation affect equilibrium in a manner similar to an increase in the central bank's weight on future social welfare, making it more likely an opportunistic central bank will actually deliver on its announced inflation targets, and output expansions can arise even if the central banker is revealed to be a low inflation type. The model also illustrates the channels through which inflation scares raise current real interest rates. Copyright 2000 by Oxford University Press.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 52 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://oep.oupjournals.org/
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.oup.co.uk/journals|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:52:y:2000:i:2:p:249-71. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.