Quotas in Brazilian Public Universities: Good or Bad Idea?
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- Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
- George A. Kahn & Klara Parrish, 1998. "Conducting monetary policy with inflation targets," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Q III, pages 5-32.
- Taylor, John B., 1983. "`Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy' by Robert J. Barro and David B. Gordon," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 123-125.
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