Models of Policy under Stochastic Replanning
This paper considers a policy environment in which policy is not set by a single policymaker, but by a sequence of policymaking administrations. Administration turnover is determined by a simple random process. The consequences of administration turnover are traced through for two versions of a linear rational expectations model, and numerical simulations of various policy environments are presented.
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Volume (Year): 28 (1987)
Issue (Month): 3 (October)
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