An anticipative feedback solution for the infinite-horizon, linear-quadratic, dynamic, Stackelberg game
No abstract is available for this item.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Miller, Marcus & Salmon, Mark, 1984.
"Dynamic Games and the Time Inconsistency of Optimal Policy in Open Economies,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
27, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Miller, Marcus & Salmon, Mark, 1985. "Dynamic Games and the Time Inconsistency of Optimal Policy in Open Economies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 124-37, Supplemen.
- Miller, Marcus & Salmon, Mark, 1983. "Dynamic Games and the Time Inconsistency of Optimal Policy in Open Economies," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 232, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983.
"Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
- Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Townsend, Robert M, 1983. "Forecasting the Forecasts of Others," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 546-88, August.
- David Backus & John Driffill, 1985. "Rational Expectations and Policy Credibility Following a Change in Regime," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(2), pages 211-221.
- Zadrozny, Peter, 1988. "A consistent, closed-loop solution for infinite-horizon, linear-quadratic, dynamic Stackelberg games," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 155-159, March.
- Canzoneri, Matthew B & Gray, Jo Anna, 1985. "Monetary Policy Games and the Consequences of Non-cooperative Behavior," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(3), pages 547-64, October.
- Kydland, Finn, 1975. "Noncooperative and Dominant Player Solutions in Discrete Dynamic Games," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 16(2), pages 321-35, June.
- Turnovsky, Stephen J & Basar, Tamer & d'Orey, Vasco, 1988.
"Dynamic Strategic Monetary Policies and Coordination in Interdependent Economies,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 78(3), pages 341-61, June.
- Stephen J. Turnovsky & Tamer Basar & Vasco d'Orey, 1987. "Dynamic Strategic Monetary Policies and Coordination in Interdependent Economies," NBER Working Papers 2467, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Fischer, Stanley, 1980. "Dynamic inconsistency, cooperation and the benevolent dissembling government," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 93-107, May.
- Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
- Kydland, Finn, 1977. "Equilibrium solutions in dynamic dominant-player models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 307-324, August.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:26:y:2002:i:9-10:p:1397-1416. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.