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Dynamic Games and the Time Inconsistency of Optimal Policy in Open Economies

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  • Miller, Marcus
  • Salmon, Mark

Abstract

It has been argued that the Bretton Woods system (of pegged but adjustable exchange rates) set up after World War II was designed specifically to prevent the manipulation of exchange rates in pursuit of national macroeconomic objectives (see R. Cooper) ; so it is perhaps no coincidence that the ending of pegged rates has led to the re-emergence of theories and policies involving such "manipulation". Before the war, when inflation was low and unemployment high in the major industrialised nations, this involved "competitive depreciation" as countries tried to gain employment ; in the late 1970's and early 1980's, however, countries like the UK and the US have embarked on policies of competitive appreciation in order to cut inflation, regarded as the first priority. Sharp movements in exchange rates, however, constitute a threat to orderly trade and stimulate protectionism, as Bergsten (1981) argues.
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  • Miller, Marcus & Salmon, Mark, 1985. "Dynamic Games and the Time Inconsistency of Optimal Policy in Open Economies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 124-137, Supplemen.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:95:y:1985:i:380a:p:124-37
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    Cited by:

    1. Lockwood, Ben, 1996. "Uniqueness of Markov-perfect equilibrium in infinite-time affine-quadratic differential games," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 20(5), pages 751-765, May.
    2. Reinhard Neck, 1986. "Kann Stabilisierungspolitik unter Unsicherheit und Risiko "optimal" sein?," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 122(III), pages 509-534, September.
    3. Miller, Marcus H, 1985. "Monetary Stabilization Policy in an Open Economy," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 32(3), pages 220-233, November.
    4. Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2017. "A Simple Algorithm for Solving Ramsey Optimal Policy with Exogenous Forcing Variables," Papers 1708.07996, arXiv.org.
    5. Willem H. Buiter, 1984. "Fiscal policy in open, interdependent economies," NBER Working Papers 1429, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Chatelain, Jean-Bernard & Ralf, Kirsten, 2014. "Stability and Identification with Optimal Macroprudential Policy Rules," MPRA Paper 55282, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Patrick Artus, 1987. "Fixation de l'objectif monétaire et réputation de la Banque Centrale," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 38(4), pages 807-836.
    8. Juha Kilponen, 2004. "Robust expectations and uncertain models – A robust control approach with application to the New Keynesian economy," GE, Growth, Math methods 0404004, EconWPA.
    9. Dan Protopopescu, 2009. "Dynamic Stackelberg Game with Risk-Averse Players: Optimal Risk-Sharing under Asymmetric Information," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 797.09, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    10. Daniel Cohen & Jacques Mélitz & Gérard Oudiz, 1988. "Le système monétaire européen et l'asymétrie franc-mark," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 39(3), pages 667-678.
    11. Chatelain, Jean-Bernard & Ralf Kirsten, 2016. "Countercyclical versus Procyclical Taylor Principles," EconStor Preprints 129796, ZBW - German National Library of Economics.
    12. Meulendijks, Pieter J F G & Schouten, Dick B J, 1995. "Exchange rates and the European business cycle: An application of a quasi-empirical two-country model," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 35-52, January.
    13. Miller, Marcus & Salmon, Mark, 1990. "When does coordination pay?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 14(3-4), pages 553-569, October.
    14. Karp, Larry & Lee, In Ho, 2003. "Time-consistent policies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 353-364, October.
    15. Jeffrey A. Frankel & Katharine Rockett, 1986. "International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination When Policy-Makers Disagree on the Model," NBER Working Papers 2059, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Hansen, Lars Peter & Sargent, Thomas J., 2003. "Robust control of forward-looking models," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 581-604, April.
    17. Levine, Paul & Currie, David, 1985. "Optimal feedback rules in an open economy macromodel with rational expectations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 141-163, March.
    18. Kenneth S. Rogoff, 1983. "Productive and counterproductive cooperative monetary policies," International Finance Discussion Papers 233, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    19. David Currie & Paul Levine, 1985. "Macroeconomic Policy Design in an Interdependent World," NBER Chapters,in: International Economic Policy Coordination, pages 228-273 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Cristiano Cantore & Vasco J. Gabriel & Paul Levine & Joseph Pearlman & Bo Yang, 2013. "The science and art of DSGE modelling: II – model comparisons, model validation, policy analysis and general discussion," Chapters,in: Handbook of Research Methods and Applications in Empirical Macroeconomics, chapter 19, pages 441-463 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    21. Chen Ling & Michael Caputo, 2012. "The Envelope Theorem for Locally Differentiable Nash Equilibria of Discounted and Autonomous Infinite Horizon Differential Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 313-334, September.
    22. Buiter, Willem H., 1984. "Policy Evaluation and Design for Continuous Time Linear Rational Expectations Models: Some Recent Developments," CEPR Discussion Papers 15, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    23. Andries Brandsma & J. Pijpers, 1985. "Coordinated strategies for economic cooperation between Europe and the United States," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 121(4), pages 661-681, December.
    24. Chen, Baoline & Zadrozny, Peter A., 2002. "An anticipative feedback solution for the infinite-horizon, linear-quadratic, dynamic, Stackelberg game," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 26(9-10), pages 1397-1416, August.
    25. Willem H. Buiter, 1983. "Optimal and Time-Consistent Polices in Continuous Time Rational Expectations Models," NBER Technical Working Papers 0029, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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