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International Policy Coordination in Dynamic Macroeconomic Models

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  • Gilles Oudiz
  • Jeffrey Sachs

Abstract

Recent analyses of the gains to policy coordination have focussed on the strategic aspects of macroeconomic policy making in a static setting. A major theme is that noncooperative policy making is likely to be Pareto inefficient because of the presence of beggar-thy-neighbor policies. This paper extends the analysis to a dynamic setting, thereby introducing three important points of realism to the static game. First, the payoffs to beggar-thy-neighbor policies look very different in one-period and multiperiod games, and thus so do the gains to coordination. Second, we show that policy coordination may reduce economic welfare if governments are nyopic in their policy making, as is sometimes claimed. Third, governments act under a fundamental constraint that they cannot bind the actions of later governments, and we investigate how this constraint alters the gains to policy coordination.

Suggested Citation

  • Gilles Oudiz & Jeffrey Sachs, 1984. "International Policy Coordination in Dynamic Macroeconomic Models," NBER Working Papers 1417, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:1417
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
    2. Willem H. Buiter & Marcus Miller, 1991. "Real Exchange Rate Overshooting and the Output Cost of Bringing Down Inflation," NBER Chapters,in: International Volatility and Economic Growth: The First Ten Years of The International Seminar on Macroeconomics, pages 239-277 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Kydland, Finn, 1975. "Noncooperative and Dominant Player Solutions in Discrete Dynamic Games," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 16(2), pages 321-335, June.
    4. Blanchard, Olivier Jean & Kahn, Charles M, 1980. "The Solution of Linear Difference Models under Rational Expectations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(5), pages 1305-1311, July.
    5. David Lipton & James M. Poterba & Jeffrey Sachs & Lawrence H. Summers, 1983. "Multiple Shooting in Rational Expectations Models," NBER Technical Working Papers 0003, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Kenneth S. Rogoff, 1983. "Productive and counterproductive cooperative monetary policies," International Finance Discussion Papers 233, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    7. Jeffrey Sachs, 1983. "International Policy Coordination in a Dynamic Macroeconomic Model," NBER Working Papers 1166, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Kydland, Finn, 1977. "Equilibrium solutions in dynamic dominant-player models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 307-324, August.
    9. Willem H. Buiter, 1983. "Optimal and Time-Consistent Polices in Continuous Time Rational Expectations Models," NBER Technical Working Papers 0029, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Pappa, Evi, 2004. "Do the ECB and the fed really need to cooperate? Optimal monetary policy in a two-country world," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 753-779, May.
    2. Hahn, Volker, 2014. "An argument in favor of long terms for central bankers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 132-135.
    3. Gilles Oudiz & Jeffrey Sachs, 1985. "International Policy Coordination in Dynamic Macroeconomic Models," NBER Chapters,in: International Economic Policy Coordination, pages 274-330 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Karp, Larry & Lee, In Ho, 2003. "Time-consistent policies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 353-364, October.
    5. Michael Evers, 2007. "Optimal Monetary Policy in an Interdependent World," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse10_2007, University of Bonn, Germany.
    6. Bohn, Frank, 2006. "Maastricht Criteria versus Stability Pact," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 247-276, April.
    7. Michael P. Evers, 2007. "Optimum Policy Domains in an Interdependent World," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse12_2007, University of Bonn, Germany.
    8. Jorge Braga de Macedo, 1984. "Trade and Financial Interdependence Under Flexible Exchange Rates: The Pacific Area," NBER Working Papers 1517, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Hahn, Volker, 2016. "Designing monetary policy committees," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 47-67.
    10. Volker Hahn, 2014. "Discretionary Policy and Multiple Equilibria in a New Keynesian Model," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2014-14, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.

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