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International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination: Any Lessons for EMU? A Selective Survey of the Literature

  • Peter Mooslechner

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  • Martin Schuerz
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1007056304742
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    Article provided by Springer in its journal Empirica.

    Volume (Year): 26 (1999)
    Issue (Month): 3 (September)
    Pages: 171-199

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:empiri:v:26:y:1999:i:3:p:171-199
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    16. Demertzis, Maria & Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 1998. "Independently Blue? Accountability and Independence in the New European Central Bank," CEPR Discussion Papers 1842, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Barry Eichengreen, 1985. "International Policy Coordination in Historical Perspective: A View from the Interwar Years," NBER Chapters, in: International Economic Policy Coordination, pages 139-183 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Hughes Hallett, A J & Vines, D, 1993. "On the Possible Costs of European Monetary Union," The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies, University of Manchester, vol. 61(1), pages 35-64, March.
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    20. Holtham, Gerald & Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 1992. "International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination When Policymakers Do Not Agree on the True Model: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 1043-51, September.
    21. Ghosh, Atish R & Masson, Paul R, 1991. "Model Uncertainty, Learning, and the Gains from Coordination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 465-79, June.
    22. Stanley Fischer & W. Michael Blumenthal & Charles L. Schultze & Alan Greenspan & Helmut Schmidt, 1988. "Macroeconomic Policy," NBER Chapters, in: International Economic Cooperation, pages 11-78 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    23. Paul R. Masson, 1992. "Portfolio Preference Uncertainty and Gains from Policy Coordination," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 39(1), pages 101-120, March.
    24. Hallett, A.J. Hughes, 1986. "International policy design and the sustainability of policy bargains," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 467-494, December.
    25. Padilla, Atilano Jorge, 1995. "Designing Institutions for International Monetary Policy Coordination," CEPR Discussion Papers 1180, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    26. Currie, David & Wren-Lewis, Simon, 1988. "Evaluating the Extended Target Zones Proposal for the G3," CEPR Discussion Papers 221, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    27. Chang, Roberto, 1991. "Financial Integration with and without International Policy Coordination," Working Papers 91-67, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    28. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    29. McCallum, Bennett T., 1999. "Issues in the design of monetary policy rules," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 23, pages 1483-1530 Elsevier.
    30. William H. Branson & Jacob A. Frenkel & Morris Goldstein, 1990. "International Policy Coordination and Exchange Rate Fluctuations," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number bran90-1.
    31. Hallett, A. J. Hughes, 1992. "Target zones and international policy coordination : The contrast between the necessary and sufficient conditions for success," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 893-914, May.
    32. Frankel, Jeffrey A & Rockett, Katharine E, 1988. "International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination When Policymakers Do Not Agree on the True Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(3), pages 318-40, June.
    33. Currie, David, 1993. "International Cooperation in Monetary Policy: Has It a Future?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(416), pages 178-87, January.
    34. Canzoneri, Matthew B & Minford, Patrick, 1986. "When International Policy Coordination Matters: An Empirical Analysis," CEPR Discussion Papers 119, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    35. Cooper, Richard N, 1969. "Macroeconomic Policy Adjustment in Interdependent Economies," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 83(1), pages 1-24, February.
    36. Peter B.. Kenen, 1990. "The Coordination of Macroeconomic Policies," NBER Chapters, in: International Policy Coordination and Exchange Rate Fluctuations, pages 63-108 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    37. Fratianni, Michele & von Hagen, Juergen, 1990. "The European Monetary System ten years after," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 173-241, January.
    38. van der Ploeg, Frederick, 1988. "International policy coordination in interdependent monetary economies," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1-2), pages 1-23, August.
    39. Ghosh, A.R. & Ghosh, S.R., 1990. "Does Model Uncertainty Really Preclude International Policy Coordination?," Papers 47, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
    40. Warwick J. McKibbin, 2002. "Macroeconomic Policy in Japan," Asian Economic Papers, MIT Press, vol. 1(2), pages 133-165.
    41. Currie, David & Wren-Lewis, Simon, 1989. "Evaluating Blueprints for the Conduct of International Macro Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(2), pages 264-69, May.
    42. Devereux, Michael B & Mansoorian, Arman, 1992. "International Fiscal Policy Coordination and Economic Growth," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 33(2), pages 249-68, May.
    43. Putnam, Robert D., 1988. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(03), pages 427-460, June.
    44. Matthew B. Canzoneri & Hali J. Edison, 1989. "A new interpretation of the coordination problem and its empirical significance," International Finance Discussion Papers 340, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    45. Jeffrey A. Frankel., 1987. "Obstacles to International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination," Economics Working Papers 8737, University of California at Berkeley.
    46. Matthew B. Canzoneri & Dale W. Henderson, 1991. "Monetary Policy in Interdependent Economies: A Game-Theoretic Approach," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031787, June.
    47. Snidal, Duncan, 1985. "The limits of hegemonic stability theory," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 39(04), pages 579-614, September.
    48. Grieco, Joseph M., 1988. "Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(03), pages 485-507, June.
    49. Oliva, Juan Carlos Martinez, 1991. "One Remark on Spillover Effects and the Gains from Coordination," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 43(1), pages 172-76, January.
    50. Hughes Hallett, A J, 1986. "Autonomy and the Choice of Policy in Asymmetrically Dependent Economies: An Investigation of the Gains from International Policy Co-ordination," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(3), pages 516-44, November.
    51. Thomas Krichel & Paul Levine & Joseph Pearlman, 1994. "Fiscal and Monetary Policy in a Monetary Union: Credible Inflation Targets or Monetised Debt?," School of Economics Discussion Papers 9403, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    52. Gourevitch, Peter Alexis, 1996. "Squaring the Circle: The Domestic Sources of International Cooperation," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(02), pages 349-373, March.
    53. Jacob A. Frenkel & Morris Goldstein & Paul R. Masson, 1989. "Simulating the Effects of Some Simple Coordinated versus Uncoordinated Policy," NBER Working Papers 2929, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    54. Canzoneri, Matthew B & Diba, Behzad, 1996. "Fiscal Constraints on Central Bank Independence and Price Stability," CEPR Discussion Papers 1463, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    55. Levine, Paul & Currie, David, 1987. "Does International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination Pay and Is It Sustainable?: A Two Country Analysis," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 39(1), pages 38-74, March.
    56. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1995. "Double-Edged Incentives: Institutions and Policy Coordination," CEPR Discussion Papers 1141, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    57. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
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    59. Gilles Oudiz & Jeffrey Sachs, 1985. "International Policy Coordination in Dynamic Macroeconomic Models," NBER Chapters, in: International Economic Policy Coordination, pages 274-330 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    60. Maria Demertzis & Andrew Hughes Hallett & Nicola Viegi, 1999. "Can the ECB be Truly Independent? Should It Be?," Empirica, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 217-240, September.
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    66. Canzoneri, Matthew B. & Henderson, Dale W., 1988. "Is sovereign policymaking bad?," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 93-140, January.
    67. Currie, David & Holtham, Gerald & Hughes, Gordon, 1989. "The Theory and Practice of International Policy Coordination: Does Coordination Pay?," CEPR Discussion Papers 325, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    68. Gilles Oudiz & Jeffrey Sachs, 1984. "Macroeconomic Policy Coordination among the Industrial Economies," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 15(1), pages 1-76.
    69. Johansen, Leif, 1982. "A note on the possibility of an international equilibrium with low levels of activity," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3-4), pages 257-265, November.
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