IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/325.html

The Theory and Practice of International Policy Coordination: Does Coordination Pay?

Author

Listed:
  • Currie, David
  • Holtham, Gerald
  • Hughes, Gordon

Abstract

This paper is a review of the theory and practice of international economic policy coordination. Coordination is defined as the joint control of some economic policies by several countries. We review the experience and the preferences of policymarkers for coordination since the War, and distinguish between the relative gains and the absolute gains. We then consider the evidence, from the academic literature, as to whether coordination is likely to pay, and we pick out some particular problems which make the policy design problem very difficult. Given that, we suggest a framework for coordinated policies involving a rule-based exchange rate management scheme aimed principally at capturing the gains of relative coordination.

Suggested Citation

  • Currie, David & Holtham, Gerald & Hughes, Gordon, 1989. "The Theory and Practice of International Policy Coordination: Does Coordination Pay?," CEPR Discussion Papers 325, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:325
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=325
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mina Baliamoune, 2000. "Economics of Summitry: An Empirical Assessment of the Economic Effects of Summits," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 27(3), pages 295-319, September.
    2. Miller, Marcus & Salmon, Mark, 1990. "When does coordination pay?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 14(3-4), pages 553-569, October.
    3. Andrew Hughes Hallett & Diana N. Weymark, 2002. "Government Leadership and Central Bank Design," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0208, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics, revised Dec 2004.
    4. Andrew Hughes Hallett, 2008. "Debt targets and fiscal sustainability in an era of monetary independence," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 165-187, July.
    5. Alogoskoufis, George & Portes, Richard, 1990. "International Costs and Benefits from EMU," CEPR Discussion Papers 424, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. A.J. Hallet, 1998. "When Do Target Zones Work? An Examination of Exchange Rate Targeting as a Device for Coordinating Economic Policies," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 115-138, April.
    7. Fabrice Capoen & Jérôme Creel, 2007. "Efficiency of stability-oriented institutions: the European case," Sciences Po Economics Publications (main) hal-03461990, HAL.
    8. Cárcamo-Díaz, Rodrigo, 2005. "Foundations of macroeconomic policy coordination: fostering dialogue as a policy tool in Latin America," Macroeconomía del Desarrollo 5404, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    9. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/2977 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Andrew Hughes-Hallett & Patrick Minford, 1990. "Target zones and exchange rate management: A stability analysis of the European Monetary System," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 175-200, June.
    11. Andrew Hughes Hallett & Diana N. Weymark, 2007. "Fiscal leadership and central bank design," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 40(2), pages 607-627, May.
    12. Andrew Hughes Hallett, 2008. "Sustainable fiscal policies and budgetary risk under alternative monetary policy arrangements," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 1-28, March.
    13. Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 2005. "In Praise of Fiscal Restraint and Debt Rules. What the Euro Zone Might Do Now," CEPR Discussion Papers 5043, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Albert Mafusire & Zuzana Brixiova, 2013. "Macroeconomic Shock Synchronization in the East African Community," Global Economy Journal (GEJ), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 13(2), pages 261-280, June.
    15. Albert Mafusire & Zuzana Brixiova, 2012. "Working Paper 156 - Macroeconomic Shock Synchronization in the East African Community," Working Paper Series 432, African Development Bank.
    16. Otmar Issing, 2002. "Anmerkungen zur Koordinierung der makroökonomischen Politik in der WWU," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 71(3), pages 312-324.
    17. Lockwood, Ben, 1996. "Uniqueness of Markov-perfect equilibrium in infinite-time affine-quadratic differential games," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 20(5), pages 751-765, May.
    18. Jeffrey Frankel & Scott Erwin & Katharine Rockett, 1991. "A Note on Internationally Coordinated Policy Packages Intended to be Robust Under Model Uncertainty," NBER Working Papers 3747, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Andrew Hughes Hallett, 2004. "Post-Thatcher Fiscal Strategies in the U.K.: An Interpretation," CESifo Working Paper Series 1372, CESifo.
    20. Peter Mooslechner & Martin Schuerz, 1999. "International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination: Any Lessons for EMU? A Selective Survey of the Literature," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 26(3), pages 171-199, September.
    21. Andrew Hughes Hallett & Diana N. Weymark, 2002. "Policy Games and the Optimal Design of Central Banks," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0220, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    22. Alexander Italianer, 1999. "The Euro and Internal Economic Policy Coordination," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 26(3), pages 201-216, September.
    23. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/2977 is not listed on IDEAS
    24. Andrew Hughes Hallett & Jan Libich & Petr Stehlík, 2011. "Welfare Improving Coordination of Fiscal and Monetary Policy," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 5(1), pages 007-026, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:325. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.