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Fiscal leadership and central bank design

Author

Listed:
  • Andrew Hughes Hallett
  • Diana N. Weymark

Abstract

This article investigates the impact, on economic performance, of the timing of moves in a policy game between the government and the central bank for a government that has both redistributional and stabilization objectives. It is shown that both inflation and income inequality are reduced without sacrificing output growth if the government assumes a leadership role compared with a regime in which monetary and fiscal policy are determined simultaneously. Further, it is shown that government leadership benefits both the fiscal and monetary authorities through the enhanced coordination that this arrangement implies.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew Hughes Hallett & Diana N. Weymark, 2007. "Fiscal leadership and central bank design," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 40(2), pages 607-627, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:40:y:2007:i:2:p:607-627
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    Cited by:

    1. Andrew Hughes Hallett & Svend E. Hougaard Jensen, 2016. "The Fiscal Framework in a Currency Union: Lessons from a Comparison between the Euro Area and the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(6), pages 803-823, June.
    2. Andrew Hughes Hallett, 2008. "Sustainable fiscal policies and budgetary risk under alternative monetary policy arrangements," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 1-28, March.
    3. Hefeker, Carsten & Zimmer, Blandine, 2011. "The optimal choice of central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 595-606.
    4. Georgios Magkonis & Abhijit Sharma, 2019. "Inflation Linkages Within The Eurozone: Core vs. Periphery," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 66(2), pages 277-289, May.
    5. Andrew Hughes Hallett, 2008. "Debt targets and fiscal sustainability in an era of monetary independence," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 165-187, July.
    6. Salvatore Capasso & Pasquale Foresti, 2024. "Monetary-fiscal policies design and financial shocks in currency unions," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 41(2), pages 439-455, July.
    7. Christos Mavrodimitrakis, 2022. "Debt stabilization and financial stability in a monetary union: Market versus authority‐based preventive solutions," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(2), pages 2582-2599, April.
    8. Andrew Hughes Hallett & Svend Jensen, 2011. "Stable and enforceable: a new fiscal framework for the Euro area," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 225-245, September.
    9. Andrew HUGHES HALLETT & Jan LIBICH & Petr STEHLÍK, 2014. "Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction with Various Degrees of Commitment," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 64(1), pages 2-29, February.
    10. Mavrodimitrakis, Christos, 2025. "The macroeconomic stabilisation and welfare implications of alternative strategic and fiscal regimes in a monetary union," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
    11. D. Masciandaro, 2019. "What Bird Is That? Central Banking And Monetary Policy In The Last Forty Years," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 19127, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    12. Shahnazarian, Hovick, 2025. "Designing fiscal stabilization rules," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 1436-1451.
    13. Donato Masciandaro & Riccardo Russo, 2022. "Central Banks and Climate Policy: Unpleasant Trade–Offs? A Principal–Agent Approach," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 22181, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    14. Demopoulos, George D. & Yannacopoulos, Nicholas A., 2016. "Why macroeconomic coordination may not be possible in a monetary union: A game theoretic approach," The Journal of Economic Asymmetries, Elsevier, vol. 13(C), pages 69-73.
    15. Christos Mavrodimitrakis, 2022. "The Policy Mix in a Monetary Union: Who Bears the Burden of Asymmetric Shocks' Stabilisation?," Economics Discussion Papers em-dp2022-12, Department of Economics, University of Reading.
    16. Andrew Hughes Hallett & Jan Libich, 2007. "Fiscal-monetary Interactions: The Effect of Fiscal Restraint and Public Monitoring on Central Bank Credibility," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 18(5), pages 559-576, November.
    17. Jan-Egbert Sturm & Cristina Bodea & Jakob de Haan & Raymond Hicks, 2025. "Central bank independence, income inequality and poverty: What do the data say?," The Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer;Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, vol. 23(1), pages 227-246, March.
    18. Andrew Hughes Hallett, 2008. "Coordination without Explicit Cooperation: Monetary-Fiscal Interactions in an Era of Demographic Change," European Economy - Economic Papers 2008 - 2015 305, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
    19. Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Bernoth, Kerstin & Lewis, John, 2008. "Did Fiscal Policy Makers Know What They Were Doing? Reassessing Fiscal Policy with Real Time Data," CEPR Discussion Papers 6758, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    20. Bernoth, Kerstin & Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Lewis, John, 2008. "Did Fiscal Policy Makers Know What They Were Doing? Reassessing Fiscal Policy with Real Time Data," CEPR Discussion Papers 6758, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    21. Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Mavrodimitrakis, Christos, 2019. "Cooperation vs. leadership in a core-periphery monetary union: Inter-country vs. inter-institutional policy coordination," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 103-122.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission

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