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Coordination without Explicit Cooperation: Monetary-Fiscal Interactions in an Era of Demographic Change

  • Andrew Hughes Hallett

Early work on the theory of economic policy stressed the importance of accounting for the interactions between fiscal and monetary policy. Tinbergen, and Cooper, taught us that there would be costs in missed targets, instability, and protracted imbalances if this was not done. Yet most models we use today treat fiscal or monetary policies as if they operated alone. This paper reviews the advantages of recognising those interactions.

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Paper provided by Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission in its series European Economy - Economic Papers with number 305.

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Length: 49 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:euf:ecopap:0305
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  1. Avinash Dixit & Luisa Lambertini, 2003. "Interactions of Commitment and Discretion in Monetary and Fiscal Policies," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 575, Boston College Department of Economics.
  2. Andrew Hughes Hallett & Diana N. Weymark, 2002. "Policy Games and the Optimal Design of Central Banks," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0220, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  3. Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Weymark, Diana N., 2004. "Independent monetary policies and social equity," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 103-110, October.
  4. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
  5. Dixit, Avinash & Lambertini, Luisa, 2003. "Symbiosis of monetary and fiscal policies in a monetary union," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 235-247, August.
  6. Andrew Hughes Hallet & Rasmus Kattai & John Lewis, 2007. "Early Warning or Just Wise After the Event?," DNB Working Papers 124, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  7. Persson, Mats & Persson, Torsten & Svensson, Lars E O, 1987. "Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary Policy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1419-31, November.
  8. John M. Roberts, 2006. "Monetary Policy and Inflation Dynamics," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 2(3), September.
  9. Robert J. Barro, 1980. "Output Effects of Government Purchases," NBER Working Papers 0432, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Demertzis, Maria & Hallett, Andrew Hughes, 1998. "Asymmetric transmission mechanisms and the rise in European unemployment: A case of structural differences or of policy failures?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 869-886, June.
  11. Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Libich, Jan & Stehlík, Petr, 2007. "Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction with Various Degrees and Types of Commitment," CEPR Discussion Papers 6586, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Weymark, Diana, 2002. "Independence before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics and Central Bank Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 3336, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. Demertzis, Maria & Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 1999. "An Independent Central Bank Faced With Elected Governments," CEPR Discussion Papers 2219, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 2005. "In Praise of Fiscal Restraint and Debt Rules. What the Euro Zone Might Do Now," CEPR Discussion Papers 5043, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  15. Sapir, Andre & Aghion, Philippe & Bertola, Giuseppe & Hellwig, Martin & Pisani-Ferry, Jean & Rosati, Dariusz & Vinals, Jose & Wallace, Helen, 2004. "An Agenda for a Growing Europe: The Sapir Report," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199271498, March.
  16. Andrew Hughes Hallett, 2004. "Post-Thatcher Fiscal Strategies in the U.K.: An Interpretation," CESifo Working Paper Series 1372, CESifo Group Munich.
  17. Nigel Pain & Isabell Koske & Marte Sollie, 2006. "Globalisation and Inflation in the OECD Economies," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 524, OECD Publishing.
  18. Bokan, Nikola & Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 2007. "The Impact of Tax, Product and Labour Market Distortions on the Phillips Curve and the Natural Rate of Unemployment," Economics Discussion Papers 2007-42, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  19. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1972. "Expectations and the neutrality of money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 103-124, April.
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