Rogoff revisited: The conservative central banker proposition under active fiscal policies
The paper re-examines Rogoff's [Rogoff, K., 1985. The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target. Quarterly Journal of Economics 100, 1169-1189.] influential monetary policy result. It shows that responses of a conservative central banker and the resulting macroeconomic outcomes may be substantially different if interactions with (ambitious) fiscal policy are taken into account.
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
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- Jan Libich & Andrew Hughes Hallett & Petr Stehlik, 2007. "Monetary And Fiscal Policy Interaction With Various Degrees And Types Of Commitment," CAMA Working Papers 2007-21, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
- Andrew Hughes Hallett & Jan Libich, 2007. "Fiscal-monetary Interactions: The Effect of Fiscal Restraint and Public Monitoring on Central Bank Credibility," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 18(5), pages 559-576, November.
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