Credibility and Flexibility with Monetary Policy Committees
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.
Other versions of this item:
- Ilian Mihov & Anne Sibert, 2002. "Credibility and Flexibility with Monetary Policy Committees," Working Papers 232002, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.
References listed on IDEAS
- Gerling, Kerstin & Gruner, Hans Peter & Kiel, Alexandra & Schulte, Elisabeth, 2005.
"Information acquisition and decision making in committees: A survey,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 563-597, September.
- Gerling, Kerstin & Grüner, Hans Peter & Kiel, Alexandra & Schulte, Elisabeth, 2003. "Information acquisition and decision making in committees: a survey," Working Paper Series 256, European Central Bank.
- Lohmann, Susanne, 1992. "Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 273-286, March.
- Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983.
"Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy,"
Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
- Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Svensson, Lars E O, 1997.
"Optimal Inflation Targets, "Conservative" Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 98-114, March.
- Lars E.O. Svensson, 1995. "Optimal Inflation Targets, `Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," NBER Working Papers 5251, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Svensson, L.E.O., 1995. "Optimal Inflation Targets, 'Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," Papers 595, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Svensson, Lars E O, 1995. "Optimal Inflation Targets, 'Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 1249, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Maurice Obstfeld & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 1996. "Foundations of International Macroeconomics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262150476, April.
- Alan S. Blinder & John Morgan, 2000.
"Are Two Heads Better than One?: An Experimental Analysis of Group vs. Individual Decisionmaking,"
Working Papers
2000-1, Princeton University. Economics Department..
- Alan S. Blinder & John Morgan, 2000. "Are Two Heads Better Than One?: An Experimental Analysis of Group vs. Individual Decisionmaking," NBER Working Papers 7909, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alan S. Blinder & John Morgan, 2001. "Are Two Heads Better Than One?: An Experimental Analysis of Group vs. Individual Decisionmaking," Working Papers 130, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
- Waller, Christopher J., 1992. "A bargaining model of partisan appointments to the central bank," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 411-428, June.
- Obstfeld, Maurice, 1997.
"Destabilizing effects of exchange-rate escape clauses,"
Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1-2), pages 61-77, August.
- Obstfeld, Maurice, 1991. "Destabilizing Effects of Exchange-Rate Escape Clauses," CEPR Discussion Papers 518, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Maurice Obstfeld., 1996. "Destabilizing Effects of Exchange-Rate Escape Clauses," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C96-075, University of California at Berkeley.
- Obstfeld, Maurice, 1996. "Destabilizing Effects of Exchange-Rate Escape Clauses," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers 233439, University of California-Berkeley, Department of Economics.
- Obstfeld, Maurice, 1996. "Destabilizing Effects of Exchange-Rate Escape Clauses," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt15n3p5dt, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Maurice Obstfeld, 1991. "Destabilizing Effects of Exchange-Rate Escape Clauses," NBER Working Papers 3603, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Faust, Jon, 1996. "Whom can we trust to run the Fed? Theoretical support for the founders' views," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 267-283, April.
- Sibert, Anne, 1999.
"Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2328, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Anne Sibert & Anne C. Sibert, 1999. "Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations," CESifo Working Paper Series 226, CESifo.
- Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982.
"Reputation and imperfect information,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
- David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1999. "Reputation and Imperfect Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 238, David K. Levine.
- Sibert, Anne, 2002.
"Monetary policy with uncertain central bank preferences,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(6), pages 1093-1109, June.
- Sibert, Anne, 2001. "Monetary Policy With Uncertain Central Bank Preferences," CEPR Discussion Papers 3113, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Adam S. Posen, 1995. "Declarations Are Not Enough: Financial Sector Sources of Central Bank Independence," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995, Volume 10, pages 253-274, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Anne Sibert, 2003. "Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(3), pages 649-665.
- McCallum, Bennett T, 1995.
"Two Fallacies Concerning Central-Bank Independence,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 207-211, May.
- Bennett T. McCallum, 1995. "Two Fallacies Concerning Central Bank Independence," NBER Working Papers 5075, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1973. "Some International Evidence on Output-Inflation Tradeoffs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(3), pages 326-334, June.
- Backus, David & Driffill, John, 1985.
"Inflation and Reputation,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 530-538, June.
- David Backus & John Driffill, 1984. "Inflation and Reputation," Working Paper 560, Economics Department, Queen's University.
- D. Backus & J. Driffil, 1998. "Inflation and Reputation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625, David K. Levine.
- Vickers, John, 1986. "Signalling in a Model of Monetary Policy with Incomplete Information," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(3), pages 443-455, November.
- Bullard, James & Waller, Christopher J, 2004.
"Central Bank Design in General Equilibrium,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 36(1), pages 95-113, February.
- James B. Bullard & Christopher J. Waller, 2002. "Central bank design in general equilibrium," Working Papers 1998-002, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
- Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
- Clive Briault & Andrew Haldane & Mervyn A. King, 1997.
"Independence and Accountability,"
Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Iwao Kuroda (ed.), Towards More Effective Monetary Policy, chapter 10, pages 299-340,
Palgrave Macmillan.
- Clive Briault & Andrew Haldane & Mervyn King, 1996. "Independence and Accountability," Bank of England working papers 49, Bank of England.
- Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983.
"A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
- Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1981. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model," NBER Working Papers 0807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Avinash Dixit & Henrik Jensen, 2000. "Equilibrium Contracts for the Central Bank of a Monetary Union," CESifo Working Paper Series 400, CESifo.
- Christopher J. Waller, 2000. "Policy Boards and Policy Smoothing," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(1), pages 305-339.
- Cukierman, Alex & Meltzer, Allan H, 1986. "A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1099-1128, September.
- Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 571-599, May.
- Dixit, Avinash & Lambertini, Luisa, 2003. "Symbiosis of monetary and fiscal policies in a monetary union," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 235-247, August.
- Lucas, Robert Jr, 1976. "Econometric policy evaluation: A critique," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 19-46, January.
- Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-167, March.
- Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Petra Gerlach-Kristen, 2008. "The Role of the Chairman in Setting Monetary Policy: Individualistic vs. Autocratically Collegial MPCs," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 4(3), pages 119-143, September.
- Gerling, Kerstin & Gruner, Hans Peter & Kiel, Alexandra & Schulte, Elisabeth, 2005.
"Information acquisition and decision making in committees: A survey,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 563-597, September.
- Gerling, Kerstin & Grüner, Hans Peter & Kiel, Alexandra & Schulte, Elisabeth, 2003. "Information acquisition and decision making in committees: a survey," Working Paper Series 256, European Central Bank.
- Willem Buiter, 2004. "A Small Corner of Intertemporal Public Finance - New Developments in Monetary Economics: 2 Ghosts, 2 Eccentricities, A Fallacy, A Mirage and A Mythos," NBER Working Papers 10524, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Manfred Neumann, 2002. "Transparency in monetary policy," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 30(4), pages 353-365, December.
- Charemza, Wojciech & Ladley, Daniel, 2016. "Central banks’ forecasts and their bias: Evidence, effects and explanation," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 804-817.
- Monticelli, Carlo, 2003. "Voting on monetary policy in the Council of the European Central Bank," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 20(5), pages 1015-1051, September.
- Buiter, Willem, 2006. "How Robust is the New Conventional Wisdom? The Surprising Fragility of the Theoretical Foundations of Inflation Targeting and C," CEPR Discussion Papers 5772, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- H.J. Roelfsema, 2006. "Why are Federal Central Banks more Activist?," Working Papers 06-06, Utrecht School of Economics.
- Wojciech Charemza & Daniel Ladley, 2012. "MPC Voting, Forecasting and Inflation," Discussion Papers in Economics 12/23, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester, revised Jan 2013.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Mihov, Ilian & Sibert, Anne, 2006. "Credibility and Flexibility with Independent Monetary Policy Committees," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(1), pages 23-46, February.
- Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2019.
"Behavioral Monetary Policymaking: Economics, Political Economy and Psychology,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Behavioral Finance The Coming of Age, chapter 9, pages 285-329,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2019. "Behavioral Monetary Policymaking: Economics, Political Economy And Psychology," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 19105, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
- Francesco Salsano, 2005. "Monetary Policy in the Presence Of Imperfect Observability Of The Objectives Of Central Bankers," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0523, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
- Masciandaro, Donato, 2022. "Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021)," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999.
"Political economics and macroeconomic policy,"
Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 22, pages 1397-1482,
Elsevier.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, "undated". "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," Working Papers 121, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Persson, T. & Tabellini, G., 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," Papers 630, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," NBER Working Papers 6329, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini , Guido, 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," Seminar Papers 630, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 1759, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Chortareas, Georgios E & Miller, Stephen M, 2003.
"Central Banker Contracts, Incomplete Information, and Monetary Policy Surprises: In Search of a Selfish Central Banker?,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(3-4), pages 271-295, September.
- Georgios E. Chortareas & Stephen M. Miller, 2002. "Central Banker Contracts, Incomplete Information, and Monetary Policy Surprises: In Search of a Selfish Central Banker?," Working papers 2002-29, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Hayo, Bernd & Hefeker, Carsten, 2002. "Reconsidering central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 653-674, November.
- Sibert, Anne, 2002.
"Monetary policy with uncertain central bank preferences,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(6), pages 1093-1109, June.
- Sibert, Anne, 2001. "Monetary Policy With Uncertain Central Bank Preferences," CEPR Discussion Papers 3113, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Berthold Herrendorf & Manfred J.M. Neumann, 2003.
"The Political Economy of Inflation, Labour Market Distortions and Central Bank Independence,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(484), pages 43-64, January.
- Herrendorf, Berthold & Neumann, Manfred J.M., 1998. "The Political Economy of Inflation, Labour Market Distortions and Central Bank Independence," CEPR Discussion Papers 1969, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Franz R. Hahn & Peter Mooslechner, 1999. "Zur Fundierung des Designs des Europäischen Zentralbanksystems," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, vol. 72(1), pages 49-60, January.
- Masciandaro, Donato & Romelli, Davide, 2015.
"Ups and downs of central bank independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: theory, institutions and empirics,"
Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(3), pages 259-289, December.
- Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2015. "Ups and Downs. Central Bank Independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: Theory, Institutions and Empirics," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1503, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
- Beetsma, Roel M W J & Jensen, Henrik, 1998.
"Inflation Targets and Contracts with Uncertain Central Banker Preferences,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 384-403, August.
- Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Jensen, H., 1996. "Inflation targets and contracts with uncertain central banker preferences," Other publications TiSEM 35324c64-bb04-42b6-b40c-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Beetsma, Roel & Jensen, Henrik, 1997. "Inflation Targets and Contracts with Uncertain Central Banker Preferences," CEPR Discussion Papers 1562, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Jensen, H., 1996. "Inflation targets and contracts with uncertain central banker preferences," Discussion Paper 1996-93, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Rotondi, Zeno, 2000. "Credibility of optimal monetary delegation: do we really need prohibitive reappointment costs?," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0003, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
- McCallum, Bennett T., 1997.
"Crucial issues concerning central bank independence,"
Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 99-112, June.
- Bennett T. McCallum, 1996. "Crucial Issues Concerning Central Bank Independence," NBER Working Papers 5597, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- D. Masciandaro, 2019. "What Bird Is That? Central Banking And Monetary Policy In The Last Forty Years," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 19127, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
- Donato Masciandaro, 2021. "Central Bank Governance in Monetary Policy Economics (1981-2020)," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21153, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
- Singleton,John, 2010. "Central Banking in the Twentieth Century," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521899093, September.
- Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2018. "To Be or not to Be a Euro Country? The Behavioural Political Economics of Currency Unions," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1883, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
- Corinne Aaron-Cureau & Hubert Kempf, 2006.
"Bargaining over monetary policy in a monetary union and the case for appointing an independent central banker,"
Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(1), pages 1-27, January.
- Corinne Aaron-Cureau & Hubert Kempf, 2004. "Bargaining over monetary policy in a monetary union and the case for appointing an independent central banker," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2004 85, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.
- Corinne Aaron-Cureau & Hubert Kempf, 2006. "Bargaining over monetary policy in a monetary union and the case of appointing an independent central banker," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00177255, HAL.
- Corinne Aaron-Cureau & Hubert Kempf, 2006. "Bargaining over monetary policy in a monetary union and the case of appointing an independent central banker," Post-Print halshs-00177255, HAL.
- Richard Mash, 2000. "The Time Inconsistency of Monetary Policy with Inflation Persistence," Economics Series Working Papers 15, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
More about this item
Keywords
Monetary policy committee; Reputation; Output stabilization; Inflationary bias;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-MAC-2003-03-17 (Macroeconomics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3278. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.