IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/halshs-00177255.html

Bargaining over monetary policy in a monetary union and the case of appointing an independent central banker

Author

Listed:
  • Corinne Aaron-Cureau

    (LARGE - Laboratoire de recherche en gestion et économie - Université Louis Pasteur - Strasbourg I - Université Robert Schuman - Strasbourg III)

  • Hubert Kempf

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

We set up a model of a monetary union where decisions over monetary policy are made through bargaining between two governments with different objectives. Theycan either choose to directly bargain over monetary policy or to delegate monetary decisions to an independent central banker. In the latter case, the choice of the central banker is obtained by bargaining between the two governments. We show that, thebargaining power being constant, the delegation of monetary policy to an independent central banker does not necessarily incur a smaller inflation bias nor is systematically welfare improving for any government. It may happen that both governments are better-off when they directly bargain.

Suggested Citation

  • Corinne Aaron-Cureau & Hubert Kempf, 2006. "Bargaining over monetary policy in a monetary union and the case of appointing an independent central banker," Post-Print halshs-00177255, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00177255
    DOI: 10.1093/oep/gpi044
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a
    for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Saito, Yuta, 2025. "Exit expectations and the optimal design of a currency union," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 247(C).
    2. Yuta Saito, 2018. "Bargaining over Monetary Policy and Optimal Committee Composition in a Currency Union," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(4), pages 1986-1996.
    3. Etienne Farvaque & Norimichi Matsueda, 2010. "On the Sustainability of a Monetary Union under External Shocks: a Theoretical Result and Its Application to the Gulf Countries," Discussion Paper Series 66, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Dec 2010.
    4. Etienne Farvaque & Norimichi Matsueda, 2009. "Monetary Unions and External Shocks," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(2), pages 1483-1491.
    5. Yuta Saito, 2022. "A Note on Time Inconsistency and Endogenous Exits from a Currency Union," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(2), pages 1-8, February.
    6. H.J. Roelfsema, 2006. "Why are Federal Central Banks more Activist?," Working Papers 06-06, Utrecht School of Economics.
    7. Hubert KEMPF, 2006. "The Constitutional Treaty of the EU and the institutional framework," Departmental Working Papers 2006-05, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00177255. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.