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The Constitutional Treaty of the EU and the institutional framework

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  • Hubert KEMPF

    ()

Abstract

The so-called Constitutional Treaty (CT) of the EU, currently in the middle of the ratification process, is seen by its advocates as a major step for the advancement of European integration, conciliating simultaneously a democratic deepening, a more efficient decision- making process in the EU, and a clearer definition of the aims and founding principles of the EU. Given the successful establishment of the Euro, the EU is facing new challenges in terms of macroeconomic policies. The Treaty tackles this issue. The present paper offers a preliminary assessment of what is achieved and concludes that the new framework represents a limited but clear progress for macroeconomic coordination and integration and offers scope for further changes. It also comments on the implicit version of fiscal federalism present in the Treaty.

Suggested Citation

  • Hubert KEMPF, 2006. "The Constitutional Treaty of the EU and the institutional framework," Departmental Working Papers 2006-05, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
  • Handle: RePEc:mil:wpdepa:2006-05
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    File URL: http://wp.demm.unimi.it/files/wp/2006/DEMM-2006_005wp.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Issing,Otmar & Gaspar,Vitor & Angeloni,Ignazio & Tristani,Oreste, 2001. "Monetary Policy in the Euro Area," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521783248.
    2. Russell Cooper & Hubert Kempf & Dan Peled, 2004. "Is it is or is it Ain't my Obligation? Regional Debt in Monetary Unions," NBER Working Papers 10239, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Willem H. Buiter, 1999. "Alice in Euroland," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 181-209, June.
    4. Corinne Aaron-Cureau & Hubert Kempf, 2006. "Bargaining over monetary policy in a monetary union and the case for appointing an independent central banker," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(1), pages 1-27, January.
    5. Russell Cooper & Hubert Kempf, 2004. "Overturning Mundell: Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(2), pages 371-396.
    6. Ping He & Lixin Huang & Randall Wright, 2005. "Money And Banking In Search Equilibrium," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(2), pages 637-670, May.
    7. Antonio Fatás, 1998. "Does EMU need a fiscal federation?," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 13(26), pages 163-203, April.
    8. Russell Cooper & Hubert Kempf, 2003. "Commitment and the Adoption of a Common Currency," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 44(1), pages 119-142, February.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    EU Constitution; Macroeconomic Policy; Institutional framework;

    JEL classification:

    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General

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