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Unkonventionelle Geldpolitik: Warum die Europäische Zentralbank ihre Unabhängigkeit nicht verloren hat

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  • Schwäbe, Carsten

Abstract

Die Banken- und Staatsschuldenkrise im Euroraum deckte wesentliche Strukturdefizite der Europäischen Währungsunion (EWU) auf und stellt nationale wie europäische Entscheidungsträger vor nie dagewesene, unvorhergesehene Herausforderungen. In diesem unsicheren Rahmen agiert ebenfalls die Europäische Zentralbank (EZB), die vor allem kurzfristig die Reaktion auf die Krise aktiv mitbestimmte und unterstützte. Sie flankierte die Reaktionen der europäischen Politik mit einem umfassenden Paket unkonventioneller geldpolitischer Maßnahmen wie dem Ankauf von Anleihen der von Schuldenkrisen betroffenen Eurostaaten. Der vorliegende Beitrag argumentiert, dass vor dem Hintergrund der unkonventionellen Geldpolitik bisher nicht von einem Verlust der Unabhängigkeit der EZB gesprochen werden kann. Die krisenbedingte Annäherung an die Politik sowie die Ausdehnung ihres geldpolitischen Instrumentariums an die Grenzen der Europäischen Verträge stellen eine mit Risiken verbundene, aber dennoch notwendige Reaktion der EZB auf die Krise dar, obgleich dadurch nur eine kurzfristige Stabilisierung, nicht aber die Beseitigung der Strukturdefizite der EWU erreicht werden kann.

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  • Schwäbe, Carsten, 2013. "Unkonventionelle Geldpolitik: Warum die Europäische Zentralbank ihre Unabhängigkeit nicht verloren hat," CIW Discussion Papers 3/2013, University of Münster, Center for Interdisciplinary Economics (CIW).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ciwdps:32013
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Zentralbanken; Unabhängigkeit; Finanzkrise; Währungsunion; central bank independence; financial crisis; monetary union;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E65 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Studies of Particular Policy Episodes
    • F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration

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