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Unabhängigkeit und Verantwortlichkeit der Europäischen Zentralbank

  • Ullrich, Katrin

Dieser Artikel gibt einen Literaturüberblick über die Kon- zepte von Unabhängigkeit und Verantwortlichkeit einer Zentralbank, wie sie aus ökonomischer Sicht wahrgenommen werden. Unabhängigkeit wird in dieser Literatur als eine Möglichkeit angesehen, um das Ziel einer niedrigen und stabilen Inflationsrate zu erreichen. Im Gegensatz dazu spielt die Verantwortlichkeit der Zentralbank für die Geldpolitik eher eine untergeordnete Rolle. Die Konzepte werden auf die Europäische Zentralbank bzw. das Europäische System der Zentralbanken angewendet.

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Paper provided by ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research in its series ZEW Discussion Papers with number 03-65.

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Date of creation: 2003
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:1495
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  13. Muscatelli, Anton, 1998. "Optimal Inflation Contracts and Inflation Targets with Uncertain Central Bank Preferences: Accountability through Independence?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(447), pages 529-42, March.
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  15. Andrew Hughes Hallett & Diana N. Weymark, 2002. "Government Leadership and Central Bank Design," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0208, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics, revised Dec 2004.
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  17. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
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  19. Alesina, Alberto & Gatti, Roberta, 1995. "Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Cost?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 196-200, May.
  20. Berthold Herrendorf & Manfred J.M. Neumann, 2003. "The Political Economy of Inflation, Labour Market Distortions and Central Bank Independence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(484), pages 43-64, January.
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  26. Eijffinger, S-C-W & de Haan, J, 1996. "The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence," Princeton Studies in International Economics 19, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
  27. Lippi, Francesco, 1998. " On Central Bank Independence and the Stability of Policy Targets," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 100(2), pages 495-512, June.
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  30. Hayo, Bernd & Hefeker, Carsten, 2002. "Reconsidering central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 653-674, November.
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