IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

The fiscal stability impact of monetary unions - looking beneath the Stability Pact debate

  • Philipp Paulus

    ()

Registered author(s):

    No abstract is available for this item.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://www.otto-wolff-institut.de/Publikationen/DiskussionPapers/OWIWO-Disc%205-2004.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by Otto-Wolff-Institut für Wirtschaftsordnung, Köln, Deutschland in its series Otto-Wolff-Institut Discussion Paper Series with number 05/2004.

    as
    in new window

    Length:
    Date of creation: Oct 2004
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:kln:owiwdp:dp_05_2004
    Contact details of provider: Postal:
    Pohligstr. 1 (Pohlighaus), 50969 Köln

    Phone: 0221/470-5348
    Fax: 0221/470-535
    Web page: http://www.otto-wolff-institut.de/index.html

    More information through EDIRC

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Niepelt, Dirk, 2002. "The Fiscal Myth of the Price Level," Seminar Papers 710, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    2. Timothy D. Lane, 1993. "Market Discipline," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 40(1), pages 53-88, March.
    3. repec:rus:hseeco:181565 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Woodford, Michael, 2001. "Fiscal Requirements for Price Stability," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 33(3), pages 669-728, August.
    5. Enrique G. Mendoza, 2002. "Why Should Emerging Economies Give Up National Currencies?: A Case for "Institutions Substitution"," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 6822, Inter-American Development Bank.
    6. Canzoneri, Matthew B & Cumby, Robert E & Diba, Behzad T, 2001. "Fiscal Discipline and Exchange Rate Systems," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(474), pages 667-90, October.
    7. Helpman, Elhanan, 1981. "An Exploration in the Theory of Exchange-Rate Regimes," Scholarly Articles 3445091, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    8. Bayoumi, Tamim & Goldstein, Morris & Woglom, Geoffrey, 1995. "Do Credit Markets Discipline Sovereign Borrowers? Evidence from the U.S. States," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(4), pages 1046-59, November.
    9. Cohen, Daniel & Portes, Richard, 2004. "Dealing with Destabilizing 'Market Discipline'," CEPR Discussion Papers 4280, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Heinemann, Friedrich, 1999. "Exchange rate regimes and fiscal discipline in OECD countries," ZEW Discussion Papers 99-04, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    11. Hans-Werner Sinn & Holger Feist, 2000. "Seignorage Wealth in the Eurosystem: Eurowinners and Eurolosers Revisited," CESifo Working Paper Series 353, CESifo Group Munich.
    12. Sebastian Edwards, 2002. "The Great Exchange Rate Debate After Argentina," NBER Working Papers 9257, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Beetsma, Roel & Uhlig, Harald, 1999. "An Analysis of the Stability and Growth Pact," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(458), pages 546-71, October.
    14. Heinemann, Friedrich & Winschel, Viktor, 2001. "Public deficits and borrowing costs: the missing half of market discipline," ZEW Discussion Papers 01-16, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    15. Eichengreen, Barry & von Hagen, Jurgen, 1995. "Fiscal Policy and Monetary Union: Federalism, Fiscal Restrictions and the No-Bailout Rule," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers 233417, University of California-Berkeley, Department of Economics.
    16. Krugman, Paul & Venables, Anthony J., 1996. "Integration, specialization, and adjustment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 959-967, April.
    17. Michael Woodford, 1996. "Control of the Public Debt: A Requirement for Price Stability?," NBER Working Papers 5684, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1996. "Models of Currency Crises with Self-fulfilling Features," CEPR Discussion Papers 1315, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    19. Fritz Breuss & Markus Eller, 2004. "The Optimal Decentralisation of Government Activity: Normative Recommendations for the European Constitution," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 27-76, 03.
    20. repec:cto:journl:v:24:y:2004:i:1-2:p:151-161 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1994. "The Political Economy of Budget Deficits," NBER Working Papers 4637, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    22. Xavier Sala-i-Martin & Jeffrey Sachs, 1991. "Fiscal Federalism and Optimum Currency Areas: Evidence for Europe From the United States," NBER Working Papers 3855, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    23. De Grauwe, Paul, 1995. "The Economics of Convergence towards Monetary Union in Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 1213, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    24. Giancarlo Corsetti & Paolo Pesenti, 2002. "Self-validating optimum currency areas," Staff Reports 152, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    25. Roland Vaubel, 2004. "The Future of the Euro: A Public Choice Approach," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 24(1-2), pages 151-161, Spring/Su.
    26. Bernoth, Kerstin & von Hagen, Jürgen & Schuknecht, Ludger, 2004. "Sovereign risk premia in the European government bond market," ZEI Working Papers B 26-2003, University of Bonn, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies.
    27. Willem H. Buiter, 2002. "The Fiscal Theory Of The Price Level: A Critique," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(481), pages 459-480, July.
    28. Eichengreen, Barry, 2003. "Institutions for Fiscal Stability," Institute of European Studies, Working Paper Series qt34p6v7pt, Institute of European Studies, UC Berkeley.
    29. Rudi Dornbusch, 2001. "Fewer Monies, Better Monies," NBER Working Papers 8324, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    30. Heinemann, Friedrich, 1998. "EMU and fiscal discipline: the end of the depreciation threat," ZEW Discussion Papers 98-30, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    31. Reinhart, Carmen & Rogoff, Kenneth, 2004. "The modern history of exchange rate arrangements: A reinterpretation," MPRA Paper 14070, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    32. repec:cto:journl:v:20:y:2000:i:1:p:49-59 is not listed on IDEAS
    33. Ullrich, Katrin, 2003. "Unabhängigkeit und Verantwortlichkeit der Europäischen Zentralbank," ZEW Discussion Papers 03-65, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    34. Tornell, Aaron & Velasco, Andres, 1995. "Fixed Versus Flexible Exchange Rates: Which Provides More Fiscal Discipline," Working Papers 95-06, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    35. Mongelli, Francesco Paolo, 2002. ""New" views on the optimum currency area theory: what is EMU telling us?," Working Paper Series 0138, European Central Bank.
    36. Jeffrey Frankel & Andrew Rose, 2002. "An Estimate of the Effect of Common Currencies on Trade and Income," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(2), pages 437-466.
    37. Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 1981. "Some unpleasant monetarist arithmetic," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Fall.
    38. Yan Sun, 2003. "Do Fixed Exchange Rates Induce More Fiscal Discipline?," IMF Working Papers 03/78, International Monetary Fund.
    39. Peter Bofinger, 2003. "The Stability and Growth Pact neglects the policy mix between fiscal and monetary policy," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;German National Library of Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 38(1), pages 4-7, January.
    40. Leland B. Yeager, 2000. "Exchange Rates between What Sorts of Currencies?," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 20(1), Spring/Su.
    41. Klodt, Henning, 1999. "Internationale Politikkoordination: Leitlinien für den globalen Wirtschaftspolitiker," Kiel Discussion Papers 343, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
    42. Matthew B. Canzoneri & Robert E. Cumby & Behzad T. Diba, 2002. "Should the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve be concerned about fiscal policy?," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 333-389.
    43. Fatás, Antonio & Rose, Andrew K, 2001. "Do Monetary Handcuffs Restrain Leviathan? Fiscal Policy in Extreme Exchange Rate Regimes," CEPR Discussion Papers 2692, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    44. Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1995. "The Political Economy of Budget Deficits," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 42(1), pages 1-31, March.
    45. George S. Tavlas, 2003. "The Economics of Exchange-Rate Regimes: A Review Essay," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(8), pages 1215-1246, 08.
    46. Liliane Karlinger, 2002. "The Impact of Common Currencies on Financial Markets: A Literature Review and Evidence from the Euro Area," Staff Working Papers 02-35, Bank of Canada.
    47. Willem H. Buiter, 2003. "Ten Commandments for a Fiscal Rule in the E(M)U," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 84-99.
    48. Tornell, Aaron & Velasco, Andres, 1998. "Fiscal discipline and the choice of a nominal anchor in stabilization," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 1-30, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kln:owiwdp:dp_05_2004. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Müller)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.