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Exchange Rate Regimes And Fiscal Discipline: The Role Of Capital Controls

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  • GUILLERMO VULETIN

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/ecin.12019
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Article provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.

Volume (Year): 51 (2013)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: 2096-2109

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Handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:51:y:2013:i:4:p:2096-2109
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  7. Paolo Mauro & Grace Juhn, 2002. "Long-Run Determinants of Exchange Rate Regimes; A Simple Sensitivity Analysis," IMF Working Papers 02/104, International Monetary Fund.
  8. Reinhart, Carmen M. & Vegh, Carlos A., 1995. "Nominal interest rates, consumption booms, and lack of credibility: A quantitative examination," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 357-378, April.
  9. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2004. "The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A Reinterpretation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 119(1), pages 1-48.
  10. James Tobin, 1978. "A Proposal for International Monetary Reform," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 4(3-4), pages 153-159, Jul/Oct.
  11. Calvo, Guillermo A, 1989. "Anticipated Devaluations," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 30(3), pages 587-606, August.
  12. Guidotti, Pablo E. & Vegh, Carlos A., 1992. "Macroeconomic interdependence under capital controls : A two-country model of dual exchange rates," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3-4), pages 353-367, May.
  13. Fatás, Antonio & Rose, Andrew K, 2001. "Do Monetary Handcuffs Restrain Leviathan? Fiscal Policy in Extreme Exchange Rate Regimes," CEPR Discussion Papers 2692, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. Enrique Alberola & Luis Molina & Daniel Navia, 2005. "Say you fix, enjoy and relax: the deleterious effect of peg announcements on fiscal discipline," Working Papers 0523, Banco de España;Working Papers Homepage.
  15. Francesco Giavazzi & Marco Pagano, 1991. "The Advantage of Tying One's Hands: EMS Discipline and Central Bank Credibility," NBER Chapters,in: International Volatility and Economic Growth: The First Ten Years of The International Seminar on Macroeconomics, pages 303-330 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Paul R Masson & Morris Goldstein & Jacob A. Frenkel, 1991. "Characteristics of a Successful Exchange Rate System," IMF Occasional Papers 82, International Monetary Fund.
  17. Blundell, Richard & Bond, Stephen, 1998. "Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 115-143, August.
  18. Peter J Montiel & Bijan B. Aghevli & Mohsin S. Khan, 1991. "Exchange Rate Policy in Developing Countries; Some Analytical Issues," IMF Occasional Papers 78, International Monetary Fund.
  19. Allan Drazen & Elhanan Helpman, 1987. "Stabilization with Exchange Rate Management," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(4), pages 835-855.
  20. Auernheimer, Leonardo, 1974. "The Honest Government's Guide to the Revenue from the Creation of Money," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(3), pages 598-606, May/June.
  21. Guillermo J. Vuletin, 2004. "Exchange Rate Regimes And Fiscal Performance. Do Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes Generate More Discipline Than Flexible Ones?," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 474, Econometric Society.
  22. Kamin, Steven B., 1993. "Devaluation, exchange controls, and black markets for foreign exchange in developing countries," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 151-169, February.
  23. Rodney Ramcharan, 2005. "Cataclysms and Currencies; Does the Exchange Rate Regime Matter for Real Shocks?," IMF Working Papers 05/85, International Monetary Fund.
  24. Enrique Alberola & Luis Molina, 2003. "What Does Really Discipline Fiscal Policy in Emerging Markets?: the Role and Dynamics of Exchange Rate Regimes," Money Affairs, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, vol. 0(2), pages 165-192, July-Dece.
  25. Calvo, Guillermo A, 1986. "Temporary Stabilization: Predetermined Exchange Rates," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(6), pages 1319-1329, December.
  26. Tornell, Aaron & Velasco, Andres, 1998. "Fiscal discipline and the choice of a nominal anchor in stabilization," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 1-30, October.
  27. de Macedo, Jorge Braga, 1982. "Exchange rate behavior with currency inconvertibility," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1-2), pages 65-81, February.
  28. Manuel Arellano & Stephen Bond, 1991. "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 277-297.
  29. Rizzo, Jean-Marc, 1998. "The economic determinants of the choice of an exchange rate regime: a probit analysis," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 283-287, June.
  30. Calvo, Guillermo A., 1991. "Temporary stabilization policy : The case of flexible prices and exchange rates," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 197-213.
  31. Yan Sun, 2003. "Do Fixed Exchange Rates Induce More Fiscal Discipline?," IMF Working Papers 03/78, International Monetary Fund.
  32. Calvo, Guillermo A., 1981. "Devaluation: Levels versus rates," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 165-172, May.
  33. Jagdish N. Bhagwati, 1978. "Anatomy and Consequences of Exchange Control Regimes," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number bhag78-1, June.
  34. Ahn, Seung C. & Schmidt, Peter, 1995. "Efficient estimation of models for dynamic panel data," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 5-27, July.
  35. Helene Poirson Ward, 2001. "How Do Countries Choose their Exchange Rate Regime?," IMF Working Papers 01/46, International Monetary Fund.
  36. Pablo E. Guidotti, 1988. "Insulation Properties under Dual Exchange Rates," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 21(4), pages 799-813, November.
  37. Drazen, Allan, 1985. "Tight money and inflation: Further Results," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 113-120, January.
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