IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/10533.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Dealing with Destabilizing 'Market Discipline'

Author

Listed:
  • Daniel Cohen
  • Richard Portes

Abstract

If interest rates (country spreads) rise, debt can rapidly be subject to a snowball effect, which then becomes self-fulfilling with regard to the fundamentals themselves. This is a market imperfection, because we cannot be confident that the unaided market will choose the good equilibrium' over the bad equilibrium'. We see here a fundamental flaw in the process of market discipline. We propose a policy intervention to deal with this structural weakness in the mechanisms of international capital flows. This is based on a simple taxonomy that enables us to break down the origin of crises into three components: a crisis of confidence (spreads and currency crisis), a crisis of fundamentals (real growth rate), and a crisis of economic policy (primary deficit). The policy would seek to short-circuit confidence crises, partly by using IMF support to improve ex ante incentives.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Cohen & Richard Portes, 2004. "Dealing with Destabilizing 'Market Discipline'," NBER Working Papers 10533, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10533
    Note: IFM
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w10533.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fischer, Stanley, 1999. "Reforming the International Financial System," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(459), pages 557-576, November.
    2. Uribe, Martin & Yue, Vivian Z., 2006. "Country spreads and emerging countries: Who drives whom?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 6-36, June.
    3. Calvo, Guillermo A, 1988. "Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 647-661, September.
    4. Daniel Cohen, 2000. "The HIPC Initiative: True and False Promises," OECD Development Centre Working Papers 166, OECD Publishing.
    5. Harold L. Cole & Timothy J. Kehoe, 2000. "Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(1), pages 91-116.
    6. John Williamson, 2000. "The Role of the IMF: A Guide to the Reports," Policy Briefs PB00-5, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    7. Peter H. Lindert & Peter J. Morton, 1989. "How Sovereign Debt Has Worked," NBER Chapters, in: Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, Volume 1: The International Financial System, pages 39-106, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Cohen, Daniel, 2001. "The HIPC Initiative: True and False Promises," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(3), pages 363-380, Winter.
    9. Richard Cantor & Frank Packer, 1995. "Sovereign credit ratings," Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 1(Jun).
    10. Antonio Afonso, 2003. "Understanding the determinants of sovereign debt ratings: Evidence for the two leading agencies," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 27(1), pages 56-74, March.
    11. Daniel Cohen, 2001. "The HIPC Initiative: True and False Promises," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(3), pages 363-380.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Cohen, 2011. "La crise grecque. Leçons pour l'Europe," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 62(3), pages 383-394.
    2. Peter Montiel & Luis Servén, 2006. "Macroeconomic Stability in Developing Countries: How Much Is Enough?," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 21(2), pages 151-178.
    3. Hefeker, Carsten, 2006. "Vermeidung und Bewältigung von Verschuldungskrisen: Die Rolle privater und öffentlicher Institutionen," HWWA Discussion Papers 340, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA).
    4. Philipp Paulus, 2004. "The fiscal stability impact of monetary unions - looking beneath the Stability Pact debate," Otto-Wolff-Institut Discussion Paper Series 05/2004, Otto-Wolff-Institut für Wirtschaftsordnung, Köln, Deutschland.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Lizarazo, Sandra Valentina, 2013. "Default risk and risk averse international investors," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 317-330.
    2. Marc Raffinot, 2006. "Prêts ou dons. Commentaires," Revue d’économie du développement, De Boeck Université, vol. 14(2), pages 159-165.
    3. Gabriel Cuadra & Juan Sanchez & Horacio Sapriza, 2010. "Fiscal Policy and Default Risk in Emerging Markets," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 13(2), pages 452-469, April.
    4. Alessandro Missale & Silvia Marchesi, 2004. "What does motivate lending and aid to the HIPCs?," International Finance 0411006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Johansson, Pernilla, 2010. "Debt Relief, Investment and Growth," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 38(9), pages 1204-1216, September.
    6. Fernando A. Broner & Guido Lorenzoni & Sergio L. Schmukler, 2013. "Why Do Emerging Economies Borrow Short Term?," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11, pages 67-100, January.
    7. repec:bep:maccon:v:5:y:2005:i:1:p:1133-1133 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Anil Ari, 2015. "Sovereign Risk and Bank Risk-Taking," Working Papers 202, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).
    9. Craig Burnside & Domenico Fanizza, 2001. "Hiccups for HIPCs?," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2001-99, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    10. Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W. & Karataş, Bilge, 2023. "Three sisters: The interlinkage between sovereign debt, currency, and banking crises," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
    11. Marine De Talancé & Marin Ferry & Miguel Niño-Zarazùa, 2019. "Did Debt Relief Initiatives help to reach the MDGs? A Focus on Primary Education," Erudite Working Paper 2019-23, Erudite.
    12. Marin Ferry & Marc Raffinot, 2019. "Curse or Blessing? Has the Impact of Debt Relief Lived up to Expectations? A Review of the Effects of the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiatives for Low-Income Countries," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 55(9), pages 1867-1891, September.
    13. repec:bpj:bejmac:v:5:y:2005:i:1:p:1133-1133 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Daniel Cohen & Pierre Jacquet & Helmut Reisen, 2007. "Loans or Grants?," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 143(4), pages 764-782, December.
    15. Karatas, B., 2014. "Financial crisis and monetary policy," Other publications TiSEM 41e463f0-e122-4379-8db5-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    16. European Network on Development, 2001. "Debt Reduction for Poverty Eradication in the Least Developed Countries: Analysis and Recommendations on LDC Debt," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2001-110, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    17. Ugo Panizza & Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2009. "The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(3), pages 651-698, September.
    18. Miguel Messmacher & Mark Kruger, 2004. "Sovereign Debt Defaults and Financing Needs," IMF Working Papers 2004/053, International Monetary Fund.
    19. Diego J. Perez, 2015. "Sovereign Debt, Domestic Banks and the Provision of Public Liquidity," Discussion Papers 15-016, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    20. Bahaj, Saleem, 2020. "Sovereign spreads in the Euro area: Cross border transmission and macroeconomic implications," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 116-135.
    21. Russell Cooper & Kalin Nikolov, 2018. "Government Debt And Banking Fragility: The Spreading Of Strategic Uncertainty," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(4), pages 1905-1925, November.
    22. Cornand, Camille & Gandré, Pauline & Gimet, Céline, 2016. "Increase in home bias in the Eurozone debt crisis: The role of domestic shocks," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 445-469.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10533. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.