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Increase in home bias in the Eurozone debt crisis: the role of domestic shocks

Author

Listed:
  • Camille Cornand

    () (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Pauline Gandré

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Céline Gimet

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CHERPA - Croyance, Histoire, Espace, Régulation Politique et Administrative - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - Institut d'Études Politiques [IEP] - Aix-en-Provence)

Abstract

One of the most striking consequences of the recent episode of sovereign debt market stress in the Eurozone has been the increase in the share of public debt held by the domestic sector in fragile economies. However, the causes and potential consequences of this increase were only given scarce attention in the literature on the Euro area sovereign debt crisis. In order to fill this gap, we first determine the shocks that impact the variation in the share of sovereign debt held at home in an SVAR model on a sample of Eurozone countries between 2002 and 2014, distinguishing between external and domestic shocks. Thanks to several alternative tests, we show that home bias in sovereign debt responds positively to country-specific fundamentals and expectation shocks but we find no evidence that the increase in home bias is destabilizing per se in the short-run. Second, a stylized theoretical model backed by the empirical results predicts that the consequences for sovereign debt crisis depend on the relative impact of domestic initial destabilizing shocks and increased home bias. The analysis suggests that an increase in home bias in times of sovereign debt stress, despite reflecting deteriorating fiscal conditions, may make default less likely.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Camille Cornand & Pauline Gandré & Céline Gimet, 2016. "Increase in home bias in the Eurozone debt crisis: the role of domestic shocks," Post-Print halshs-01236055, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01236055
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01236055
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    Cited by:

    1. Blot, Christophe & Ducoudré, Bruno & Timbeau, Xavier, 2016. "Sovereign debt spread and default in a model with self-fulfilling prophecies and asymmetric information," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 47(PB), pages 281-299.
    2. repec:eee:joecas:v:15:y:2017:i:c:p:17-31 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. repec:gam:jsusta:v:10:y:2018:i:4:p:1251-:d:142012 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Eurozone; Home bias; Sovereign debt crisis; Bayesian panel SVAR;

    JEL classification:

    • E4 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates
    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
    • F3 - International Economics - - International Finance
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets

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