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Increase in Home Bias and the Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis

  • Camille Cornand

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS : UMR5824 - Université Lumière - Lyon II - École Normale Supérieure (ENS) - Lyon - PRES Université de Lyon - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - Université Claude Bernard - Lyon I (UCBL))

  • Pauline Gandré

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS : UMR5824 - Université Lumière - Lyon II - École Normale Supérieure (ENS) - Lyon - PRES Université de Lyon - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - Université Claude Bernard - Lyon I (UCBL))

  • Céline Gimet

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS : UMR5824 - Université Lumière - Lyon II - École Normale Supérieure (ENS) - Lyon - PRES Université de Lyon - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - Université Claude Bernard - Lyon I (UCBL), CHERPA - Croyance, Histoire, Espace, Régulation Politique et Administrative - Institut d'Études Politiques [IEP] - Aix-en-Provence - Aix Marseille Université)

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    One of the most striking consequences of the recent episode of sovereign debt market stress in the Eurozone has been the increase in the share of public debt held by the domestic sector in fragile economies. First, we identify the shocks that explain most of the variation in this share in an S-VAR model on a sample of 7 Eurozone countries between 2007 and 2012. Home bias in sovereign debt responds positively to fundamentals and expectations shocks but we find no evidence that the increase in home bias is destabilizing per se. Second, we theoretically model the impact of the previous shocks in a second-generation model of crisis with endogenous home bias in sovereign debt. We derive conditions under which a higher home bias is associated with a change in the government's decision. Finally, we discuss which case of the model best applies to the distinct countries in our sample during the recent sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone.

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    Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number halshs-01015475.

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    Date of creation: 2014
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    Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01015475
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