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Exit Expectations and Debt Crises in Currency Unions

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  • Kriwoluzky, Alexander
  • Müller, Gernot J.
  • Wolf, Martin

Abstract

We study the impact of the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy on the low-frequency relationship between the fiscal stance and inflation using cross-country data from 1965 to 1999. In a first step, we contrast the monetary-fiscal narrative for Germany, the U.S. and Italy with evidence obtained from simple regression models and a time-varying VAR. We find that the low-frequency relationship between the fiscal stance and inflation is low during periods of an independent central bank and responsible fiscal policy and more pronounced in times of high fiscal budget deficits and accommodative monetary authorities. In a second step, we use an estimated DSGE model to interpret the low-frequency measure structurally and to illustrate the mechanisms through which fiscal actions affect inflation in the long run. The findings from the DSGE model suggest that switches in the monetary-fiscal policy interaction and accompanying variations in the propagation of structural shocks can well account for changes in the low-frequency relationship between the fiscal stance and inflation.

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  • Kriwoluzky, Alexander & Müller, Gernot J. & Wolf, Martin, 2015. "Exit Expectations and Debt Crises in Currency Unions," IWH Discussion Papers 18/2015, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:iwhdps:iwh-18-15
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    Cited by:

    1. Eichler, Stefan & Rövekamp, Ingmar, 2017. "Eurozone exit risk," CEPIE Working Papers 07/17, Technische Universität Dresden, Center of Public and International Economics (CEPIE).
    2. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Kuester, Keith & Müller, Gernot, 2016. "The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates in a Great Recession," CEPR Discussion Papers 11432, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Jeroen Hessel & Niels Gilbert & Jasper de Jong, 2017. "Capitalising on the euro. Options for strengthening the EMU," DNB Occasional Studies 1502, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    currency union; exit; sovereign debt crisis; fiscal policy; redenomination premium; euro crisis; regime-switching model;

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
    • F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics

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