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Sovereign Risk, Fiscal Policy, and Macroeconomic Stability

  • Corsetti, Giancarlo
  • Kuester, Keith
  • Meier, André
  • Müller, Gernot

This paper analyzes the impact of strained government finances on macroeconomic stability and the transmission of fiscal policy. Using a variant of the model by Curdia and Woodford (2009), we study a 'sovereign risk channel' through which sovereign default risk raises funding costs in the private sector. If monetary policy is constrained, the sovereign risk channel exacerbates indeterminacy problems: private-sector beliefs of a weakening economy may become self-fulfilling. In addition, sovereign risk amplifies the effects of negative cyclical shocks. Under those conditions, fiscal retrenchment can help curtail the risk of macroeconomic instability and, in extreme cases, even stimulate economic activity.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 8779.

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Date of creation: Jan 2012
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8779
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  1. Troy Davig & Eric M. Leeper, 2006. "Generalizing the Taylor Principle," Caepr Working Papers 2006-001, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington.
  2. Ardagna, Silvia & Lane, Timothy & Caselli, Francesco, 2007. "Fiscal Discipline and the Cost of Public Debt Service: Some Estimates for OECD Countries," Scholarly Articles 2579739, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  3. Vasco Curdia & Michael Woodford, 2008. "Credit Frictions and Optimal Monetary Policy," Discussion Papers 0809-02, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  4. Eduardo A. Cavallo & Patricio Valenzuela, 2007. "The Determinants of Corporate Risk in Emerging Markets: An Option-Adjusted Spread Analysis," Research Department Publications 4513, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  5. Mertens, Karel & Ravn, Morten O, 2010. "Fiscal Policy in an Expectations Driven Liquidity Trap," CEPR Discussion Papers 7931, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Francesco Giavazzi & Marco Pagano, 1990. "Can Severe Fiscal Contractions Be Expansionary? Tales of Two Small European Countries," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1990, Volume 5, pages 75-122 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Thomas Laubach, 2009. "New Evidence on the Interest Rate Effects of Budget Deficits and Debt," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 7(4), pages 858-885, 06.
  8. Ana M. Aizcorbe & Arthur B. Kennickell & Kevin B. Moore, 2003. "Recent changes in U.S. family finances: evidence from the 1998 and 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), issue Jan, pages 1-32.
  9. Benhabib, J. & Schmitt-Grohe, S. & Uribe, M., 1999. "Avoiding Liquidity Traps," Working Papers 99-21, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  10. Ugo Panizza & Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2009. "The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(3), pages 651-98, September.
  11. Andreas Schabert & Sweder J.G. van Wijnbergen, 2011. "Sovereign Default and the Stability of Inflation Targeting Regimes," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-064/2/ DSF20, Tinbergen Institute.
  12. Huixin Bi & Eric M. Leeper, 2010. "Sovereign Debt Risk Premia and Fiscal Policy in Sweden," NBER Working Papers 15810, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Vincent Reinhart & Brian Sack, 2000. "The Economic Consequences of Disappearing Government Debt," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 31(2), pages 163-220.
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