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Sovereign risk and belief-driven fluctuations in the euro area

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  • Corsetti, Giancarlo
  • Kuester, Keith
  • Meier, André
  • Müller, Gernot J.

Abstract

Sovereign risk premia in several euro area countries have risen markedly since 2008, driving up credit spreads in the private sector as well. We propose a New Keynesian model of a two-region monetary union that accounts for this “sovereign risk channel.” The model is calibrated to the euro area as of mid-2012. We show that a combination of sovereign risk in one region and strongly procyclical fiscal policy at the aggregate level exacerbates the risk of belief-driven deflationary downturns. The model provides an argument in favor of coordinated, asymmetric fiscal stances as a way to prevent self-fulfilling debt crises.

Suggested Citation

  • Corsetti, Giancarlo & Kuester, Keith & Meier, André & Müller, Gernot J., 2014. "Sovereign risk and belief-driven fluctuations in the euro area," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 53-73.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:61:y:2014:i:c:p:53-73 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2013.11.001
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    Cited by:

    1. Cúrdia, Vasco & Woodford, Michael, 2016. "Credit Frictions and Optimal Monetary Policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, pages 30-65.
    2. Piotr Ciżkowicz & Andrzej Rzońca & Rafał Trzeciakowski, 2015. "Membership in the Euro area and fiscal sustainability - Analysis through panel fiscal reaction functions," a/ Working Papers Series 1501, Italian Association for the Study of Economic Asymmetries, Rome (Italy).
    3. Mats Persson, 2016. "Debts, Deficits and Multiple Equilibria: A New Role for ECB Monetary Policy?," CESifo Forum, Ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 17(1), pages 63-71, April.
    4. Eichler, Stefan & Rövekamp, Ingmar, 2017. "Eurozone exit risk," CEPIE Working Papers 07/17, Technische Universität Dresden, Center of Public and International Economics (CEPIE).
    5. Piotr Ciżkowicz & Andrzej Rzońca & Rafał Trzeciakowski, 2015. "Windfall of Low Interest Payments and Fiscal Sustainability in the Euro Area: Analysis through Panel Fiscal Reaction Functions," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(4), pages 475-510, November.
    6. Müller, Gernot Johannes & Hettig, Thomas & Mueller, Gernot, 2015. "Fiscal policy coordination in currency unions (at the zero lower bound)," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112826, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    7. Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Kobielarz, M.L. & Uras, R.B., 2015. "Sovereign Debt, Bail-Outs and Contagion in a Monetary Union," Discussion Paper 2015-018, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    8. Thomas Brand & Fabien Tripier, 2014. "Risk shocks and divergence between the Euro area and the US," Working Papers 2014-11, CEPII research center.
    9. Christophe Blot & Marion Cochard & Jérôme Creel & Bruno Ducoudré & Danielle Schweisguth & Xavier Timbeau, 2014. "Fiscal consolidation in times of crisis: is the sooner really the better?," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(1), pages 159-192.
    10. André Diniz & Bernardo Guimaraes, 2017. "How diabolic is the sovereign-bank loop? The effects of post-default fiscal policies," Discussion Papers 1705, Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM).
    11. Lama, Ruy & Rabanal, Pau, 2014. "Deciding to enter a monetary union: The role of trade and financial linkages," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 138-165.
    12. Andreas Tischbirek, 2016. "Unconventional Monetary Policy in a Currency Union with Segmentation in the Market for Government Debt," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 16.16, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
    13. Dennis Bonam & Jasper Lukkezen, 2014. "Fiscal and Monetary Policy Coordination, Macroeconomic Stability, and Sovereign Risk," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-006/VI, Tinbergen Institute.
    14. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Dedola, Luca & Jarociński, Marek & Maćkowiak, Bartosz & Schmidt, Sebastian, 2016. "Macroeconomic stabilization, monetary-fiscal interactions, and Europe’s monetary union," Working Paper Series 1988, European Central Bank.
    15. Corsetti, G. & Dedola, L. & Jarociński, M. & Mańkowiak, B. & Schmidt, S., 2016. "Macroeconomic Stabilization, Monetary-fiscal Interactions, and Europe's monetary Union," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1675, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    16. Faia, Ester, 2017. "Sovereign risk, bank funding and investors’ pessimism," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, pages 79-96.
    17. Philippe Martin & Thomas Philippon, 2017. "Inspecting the Mechanism: Leverage and the Great Recession in the Eurozone," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/59bp0vqv2b8, Sciences Po.
    18. Pierre-Richard Agénor & Pengfei Jia, 2017. "Macroprudential Policy Coordination in a Currency Union'," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 235, Economics, The Univeristy of Manchester.
    19. repec:eee:eecrev:v:100:y:2017:i:c:p:337-363 is not listed on IDEAS
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    21. Bernardo Guimaraes & Caio Machado & Marcel Ribeiro, 2016. "A Model of the Confidence Channel of Fiscal Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(7), pages 1363-1395, October.
    22. Diniz, Andre & Guimaraes, Bernardo, 2014. "Financial disruption as a cost of sovereign default: a quantitative assessment," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 86329, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    23. Bhattarai, Saroj & Lee, Jae Won & Park, Woong Yong, 2015. "Optimal monetary policy in a currency union with interest rate spreads," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 375-397.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sovereign risk channel; Monetary union; Euro area; Zero lower bound; Risk premium; Pooling of sovereign risk;

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
    • F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics
    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission

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