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Inflation Targeting with Sovereign Default Risk

Author

Listed:
  • Cristina Arellano

    (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis)

  • Gabriel Mihalache

    (Stony Brook University)

  • Yan Bai

    (University of Rochester)

Abstract

Since the early 2000s, many emerging markets have adopted inflation targeting as their monetary policy, against a background of recurring sovereign debt crises. We develop a framework that integrates inflation targeting monetary policy with sovereign default risk and identify important interactions. Monetary policy alters incentives for international borrowing and sovereign default risk leads to more volatile nominal interest rates, needed to target inflation. We show that this framework replicates the positive co-movements of sovereign interest rate spreads with domestic nominal rates and inflation, a salient feature of emerging markets data. Our framework rationalizes the experience of Brazil during the 2015 downturn, which featured high inflation, high nominal rates, and high sovereign spreads. Our counterfactual experiment suggests that by raising the domestic rate the Brazilian central bank not only reduced inflation but also alleviated the debt crisis.

Suggested Citation

  • Cristina Arellano & Gabriel Mihalache & Yan Bai, 2019. "Inflation Targeting with Sovereign Default Risk," 2019 Meeting Papers 239, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    • Handle: RePEc:red:sed019:239
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Sewon Hur & Illenin O. Kondo & Fabrizio Perri, 2018. "Real Interest Rates, Inflation, and Default," Staff Report 574, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    2. Wenxin Du & Carolin E. Pflueger & Jesse Schreger, 2020. "Sovereign Debt Portfolios, Bond Risks, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(6), pages 3097-3138, December.
    3. Emilio Espino & Julian Kozlowski & Fernando M. Martin & Juan M. Sánchez, 2025. "Domestic Policies and Sovereign Default," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 74-113, July.
    4. Yasin Kursat Onder & Enes Sunel, 2021. "Inflation-default trade-off without a nominal anchor: The case of Greece," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 39, pages 55-78, January.
    5. Marina Azzimonti & Laura Karpuska & Gabriel Mihalache, 2020. "Bargaining over Mandatory Spending and Entitlements," Department of Economics Working Papers 20-02, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
    6. Keiichiro Kobayashi & Kozo Ueda, 2022. "Secular Stagnation and Low Interest Rates under the Fear of a Government Debt Crisis," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(4), pages 779-824, June.
    7. Tenreyro, Silvana & Drechsel, Thomas & McLeay, Michael, 2019. "Monetary policy for commodity booms and busts," CEPR Discussion Papers 14030, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Javier Bianchi & Jorge Mondragon, 2022. "Monetary Independence and Rollover Crises," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 137(1), pages 435-491.
    9. Marina Azzimonti & Gabriel P. Mihalache & Laura Karpuska, 2020. "Bargaining over Taxes and Entitlements," NBER Working Papers 27595, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics

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