IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fip/fedmwp/755.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Monetary Independence and Rollover Crises

Author

Listed:
  • Bianchi, Javier

    (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis)

  • Mondragon, Jorge

    (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis)

Abstract

This paper shows that the inability to use monetary policy for macroeconomic stabilization leaves a government more vulnerable to a rollover crisis. We study a sovereign default model with self-fulfilling rollover crises, foreign currency debt, and nominal rigidities. When the government lacks monetary autonomy, lenders anticipate that the government will face a severe recession in the event of a liquidity crisis, and are therefore more prone to run on government bonds. By contrast, a government with monetary autonomy can stabilize the economy and can easily remain immune to a rollover crisis. In a quantitative application, we find that the lack of monetary autonomy played a central role in making the Eurozone vulnerable to a rollover crisis. A lender of last resort can help ease the costs from giving up monetary independence.

Suggested Citation

  • Bianchi, Javier & Mondragon, Jorge, 2018. "Monetary Independence and Rollover Crises," Working Papers 755, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedmwp:755
    DOI: 10.21034/wp.755
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/wp/wp755.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. repec:eee:jetheo:v:175:y:2018:i:c:p:803-812 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Horacio Sapriza & Emircan Yurdagul & Juan Sanchez, 2014. "Sovereign default and the choice of maturity," 2014 Meeting Papers 799, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    3. repec:bla:jeurec:v:14:y:2016:i:6:p:1329-1371 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Ayres, João & Navarro, Gaston & Nicolini, Juan Pablo & Teles, Pedro, 2018. "Sovereign default: The role of expectations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 803-812.
    5. Cristina Arellano & Yan Bai & Gabriel Mihalache, 2018. "Inflation Targeting with Sovereign Default Risk," Department of Economics Working Papers 18-14, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
    6. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309.
    7. Marco Bassetto & Carlo Galli, 2019. "Is Inflation Default? The Role of Information in Debt Crises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(10), pages 3556-3584, October.
    8. Aguiar, M. & Chatterjee, S. & Cole, H. & Stangebye, Z., 2016. "Quantitative Models of Sovereign Debt Crises," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1697-1755, Elsevier.
    9. Giancarlo Corsetti & Luca Dedola, 2016. "The Mystery of the Printing Press: Monetary Policy and Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 14(6), pages 1329-1371.
    10. Wenxin Du & Jesse Schreger, 2016. "Sovereign Risk, Currency Risk, and Corporate Balance Sheets," Harvard Business School Working Papers 17-024, Harvard Business School.
    11. Bianchi, Javier & Ottonello, Pablo & Presno, Ignacio, 2019. "Fiscal Stimulus under Sovereign Risk," Working Papers 762, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    12. Harold L. Cole & Timothy J. Kehoe, 1996. "A self-fulfilling model of Mexico's 1994-95 debt crisis," Staff Report 210, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    13. Jeffrey Frankel & Andrew Rose, 2002. "An Estimate of the Effect of Common Currencies on Trade and Income," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(2), pages 437-466.
    14. Giancarlo Corsetti & Luca Dedola, 2012. "The "Mystery of the Printing Press" Monetary Policy and Self-fulfilling Debt Crises," Discussion Papers 1424, Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM), revised Aug 2014.
    15. Cole, Harold L. & Kehoe, Timothy J., 1996. "A self-fulfilling model of Mexico's 1994-1995 debt crisis," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-4), pages 309-330, November.
    16. repec:eee:moneco:v:95:y:2018:i:c:p:72-85 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Araujo, Aloisio & Leon, Marcia & Santos, Rafael, 2013. "Welfare analysis of currency regimes with defaultable debts," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 143-153.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sovereign debt crises; Rollover risk; Monetary unions;

    JEL classification:

    • E4 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates
    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedmwp:755. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jannelle Ruswick). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/frbmnus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.