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Monetary Independence and Rollover Crises

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  • Javier Bianchi
  • Jorge Mondragon

Abstract

This paper shows that the inability to use monetary policy for macroeconomic stabilization leaves a government more vulnerable to a rollover crisis. We study a sovereign default model with self-fulfilling rollover crises, foreign currency debt, and nominal rigidities. When the government lacks monetary autonomy, lenders anticipate that the government will face a severe recession in the event of a liquidity crisis, and are therefore more prone to run on government bonds. By contrast, a government with monetary autonomy can stabilize the economy and can easily remain immune to a rollover crisis. In a quantitative application, we find that the lack of monetary autonomy played a central role in making the Eurozone vulnerable to a rollover crisis. A lender of last resort can help ease the costs from giving up monetary independence.

Suggested Citation

  • Javier Bianchi & Jorge Mondragon, 2018. "Monetary Independence and Rollover Crises," Working Papers 755, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedmwp:755
    DOI: 10.21034/wp.755
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    Cited by:

    1. Galli, Carlo, 2021. "Self-fulfilling debt crises, fiscal policy and investment," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
    2. Philipp Heimberger, 2022. "The Cyclical Behaviour of Fiscal Policy During the Covid-19 Crisis," wiiw Working Papers 220, The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw.
    3. Arce, Fernando, 2021. "Private Overborrowing under Sovereign Risk," MPRA Paper 113176, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Javier Bianchi & Guido Lorenzoni, 2021. "The Prudential Use of Capital Controls and Foreign Currency Reserves," NBER Working Papers 29476, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Javier Bianchi & Cesar Sosa-Padilla, 2018. "Reserve Accumulation, Macroeconomic Stabilization and Sovereign Risk," 2018 Meeting Papers 1166, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    6. Matthias Burgert & Philipp Pfeiffer & Werner Roeger, 2021. "Fiscal policy in a monetary union with downward nominal wage rigidity," Working Papers 2021-16, Swiss National Bank.
    7. Javier Bianchi & Pablo Ottonello & Ignacio Presno, 2019. "Fiscal Stimulus under Sovereign Risk," NBER Working Papers 26307, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Born, Benjamin & Müller, Gernot J. & Pfeifer, Johannes & Wellmann, Susanne, 2020. "Different no more: Country spreads in advanced and emerging economies," University of Tübingen Working Papers in Business and Economics 129, University of Tuebingen, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, School of Business and Economics.
    9. Ioannis N. Kallianiotis & Iordanis Petsas, 2020. "The Effectiveness of the Single Mandate of the ECB and the Dual of the Fed," Journal of Applied Finance & Banking, SCIENPRESS Ltd, vol. 10(4), pages 1-11.
    10. Wolf, Martin, 2020. "Pecuniary externalities in economies with downward wage rigidity," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 219-235.
    11. Cristina Arellano & Yan Bai & Gabriel Mihalache, 2018. "Inflation Targeting with Sovereign Default Risk," Department of Economics Working Papers 18-14, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
    12. Debrun, Xavier & Masuch, Klaus & Ferrero, Guiseppe & Vansteenkiste, Isabel & Ferdinandusse, Marien & von Thadden, Leopold & Hauptmeier, Sebastian & Alloza, Mario & Derouen, Chloé & Bańkowski, Krzyszto, 2021. "Monetary-fiscal policy interactions in the euro area," Occasional Paper Series 273, European Central Bank.
    13. Philip R. Lane, 2021. "The Resilience of the Euro," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 35(2), pages 3-22, Spring.
    14. Manuel Amador & Javier Bianchi, 2021. "Bank Runs, Fragility, and Credit Easing," NBER Working Papers 29397, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Michal Szkup, 2022. "Preventing Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises: A Global Games Approach," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 43, pages 22-55, January.
    16. Emilio Espino & Julian Kozlowski & Fernando M. Martin & Juan M. Sanchez, 2022. "Policy Rules and Large Crises in Emerging Markets," Working Papers 2022-018, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    17. Sewon Hur & Illenin O. Kondo & Fabrizio Perri, 2018. "Real Interest Rates, Inflation, and Default," Staff Report 574, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    18. Wenxin Du & Carolin E. Pflueger & Jesse Schreger, 2020. "Sovereign Debt Portfolios, Bond Risks, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(6), pages 3097-3138, December.
    19. Hari Venkatesh & Gourishankar S. Hiremath, 2021. "The resurgence of currency mismatches: Emerging market economies are not out of the woods yet?," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 721-742, October.
    20. Hari Venkatesh & Gourishankar S Hiremath, 2020. "Currency Mismatches In Emerging Market Economies: Is Winter Coming?," Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Bank Indonesia, vol. 23(1), pages 25-54.
    21. Yasin Kürsat Önder & Enes Sunel, 2021. "Default of Depreciate," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 21/1023, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
    22. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Maeng, Seung Hyun, 2020. "Debt Crises, Fast and Slow," CEPR Discussion Papers 14868, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    23. Cristina Arellano & Yan Bai & Gabriel Mihalache, 2019. "Monetary Policy and Sovereign Risk in Emerging Economies (NK-Default)," Department of Economics Working Papers 19-02, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sovereign debt crises; Rollover risk; monetary unions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E4 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates
    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets

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