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Efficient Bailouts?

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  • Javier Bianchi

Abstract

This paper develops a non-linear DSGE model to assess the interaction between ex-post interventions in credit markets and the build-up of risk ex ante. During a systemic crisis, bailouts relax balance sheet constraints and mitigate the severity of the recession. Ex ante, the anticipation of such bailouts leads to an increase in risk-taking, making the economy more vulnerable to a financial crisis. The optimal policy requires, in general, a mix of expost intervention and ex-ante prudential policy. We also analyze the effects of bailouts on financial stability and welfare in the absence of ex-ante prudential policy. Our results show that the moral hazard effects of bailouts are significantly mitigated by making bailouts contingent on the occurrence of a systemic financial crisis.

Suggested Citation

  • Javier Bianchi, 2012. "Efficient Bailouts?," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 2012, Department of Economics - dECON.
  • Handle: RePEc:ude:wpaper:2012
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Keiichiro Kobayashi & Tomoyuki Nakajima, 2014. "A macroeconomic model of liquidity crises," KIER Working Papers 876, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    2. Fornaro, Luca, 2015. "Financial crises and exchange rate policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 202-215.
    3. Nosal, Jaromir B. & Ordoñez, Guillermo, 2016. "Uncertainty as commitment," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, pages 124-140.
    4. Kollmann, Robert & Ratto, Marco & Roeger, Werner & in′t Veld, Jan, 2013. "Fiscal policy, banks and the financial crisis," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 387-403.
    5. repec:eee:macchp:v2-1641 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Vincenzo Cuciniello & Federico M. Signoretti, 2015. "Large Banks, Loan Rate Markup, and Monetary Policy," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 11(3), pages 141-177, June.
    7. Olivier Jeanne & Anton Korinek, 2013. "Macroprudential Regulation Versus Mopping Up After the Crash," NBER Working Papers 18675, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. repec:eee:finsta:v:33:y:2017:i:c:p:71-80 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Pierpaolo GIANNOCCOLO & José Manuel MANSILLA-FERNÁNDEZ, 2017. "Bank Restructuring, Competition, and Lending Supply: Evidence from the Spanish Banking Sector," Departmental Working Papers 2017-16, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    10. Borovicka, J. & Hansen, L.P., 2016. "Term Structure of Uncertainty in the Macroeconomy," Handbook of Macroeconomics, Elsevier.
    11. Piero Gottardi & Atsushi Kajii & Tomoyuki Nakajima, 2016. "Constrained Inefficiency and Optimal Taxation with Uninsurable Risks," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 18(1), pages 1-28, February.
    12. Keiichiro Kobayashi & Tomoyuki Nakajima, 2014. "A macroeconomic model of liquidity crises," KIER Working Papers 876, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    13. Bental, Benjamin & Demougin, Dominique, 2016. "Privatizing profits and socializing losses with smoothly operating capital markets," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 179-194.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bailouts; moral hazard; credit crunch; financial shocks; macro-prudential policy;

    JEL classification:

    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • F40 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - General
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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