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Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch, and Systemic Bailouts

Author

Listed:
  • Jean Tirole

    (Toulouse School of Economics)

  • Emmanuel Farhi

    (Harvard)

Abstract

which takes the form of a minimum liquidity requirement coupled with monitoring of the quality of liquid assets. We establish the robustness of our insights when the set of bailout instruments is endogenous and characterize the structure of optimal bailouts.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean Tirole & Emmanuel Farhi, 2010. "Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch, and Systemic Bailouts," 2010 Meeting Papers 822, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  • Handle: RePEc:red:sed010:822
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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