IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch, and Systemic Bailouts

  • Jean Tirole

    (Toulouse School of Economics)

  • Emmanuel Farhi

    (Harvard)

which takes the form of a minimum liquidity requirement coupled with monitoring of the quality of liquid assets. We establish the robustness of our insights when the set of bailout instruments is endogenous and characterize the structure of optimal bailouts.

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Paper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2010 Meeting Papers with number 822.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:red:sed010:822
Contact details of provider: Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Christian Zimmermann Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis PO Box 442 St. Louis MO 63166-0442 USA
Fax: 1-314-444-8731
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/society.htmEmail:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2009. "Illiquidity and Interest Rate Policy," NBER Working Papers 15197, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Diamond, Peter A, 1982. "Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(5), pages 881-94, October.
  3. Kashyap, Anil K. & Rajan, Raghuram G. & Stein, Jeremy C., 2008. "Rethinking capital regulation," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 431-471.
  4. Cooper, Russell & John, Andrew, 1988. "Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(3), pages 441-63, August.
  5. Holmström, Bengt & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds and the Real Sector," IDEI Working Papers 40, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  6. Bengt Holmström & Jean Tirole, 2011. "Inside and Outside Liquidity," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262015781, June.
  7. Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, 1996. "Private and Public Supply of Liquidity," NBER Working Papers 5817, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Philippon, Thomas & Schnabl, Philipp, 2009. "Efficient Recapitalization," CEPR Discussion Papers 7516, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-19, June.
  10. Martin Schneider & Aaron Tornell, 2000. "Balance SHeet Effects, Bailout Guarantees and Financial Crises," NBER Working Papers 8060, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Huberto M. Ennis & Todd Keister, 2007. "Bank runs and institutions : the perils of intervention," Working Paper 07-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  12. Viral V. Acharya & Tanju Yorulmazer, 2008. "Cash-in-the-Market Pricing and Optimal Resolution of Bank Failures," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 21(6), pages 2705-2742, November.
  13. George J. Mailath & Loretta J. Mester, 1993. "A positive analysis of bank closure," Working Papers 94-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  14. Romain Ranciere & Aaron Tornell & Frank Westermann, 2005. "Systemic Crises and Growth," NBER Working Papers 11076, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
  16. Ben S. Bernanke & Mark Gertler, 1995. "Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 27-48, Fall.
  17. Martin Schneider & Aaron Tornell, 2004. "Balance Sheet Effects, Bailout Guarantees and Financial Crises," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(3), pages 883-913.
  18. Woodford, Michael, 1990. "Public Debt as Private Liquidity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 382-88, May.
  19. Ernesto Pastén, 2011. "Time - Consistent Bailout Plans," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 635, Central Bank of Chile.
  20. Acharya, Viral V & Yorulmazer, Tanju, 2004. "Too Many to Fail - An Analysis of Time Inconsistency in Bank Closure Policies," CEPR Discussion Papers 4778, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  21. V.V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2013. "Bailouts, Time Inconsistency, and Optimal Regulation," NBER Working Papers 19192, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  22. Ennis, Huberto M. & Keister, Todd, 2010. "Banking panics and policy responses," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(4), pages 404-419, May.
  23. Shin, Hyun Song & Adrian, Tobias, 2008. "Financial intermediaries, financial stability and monetary policy," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 287-334.
  24. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:red:sed010:822. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Zimmermann)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.